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Chapter 1
A Survey o f Studies in Sentence Perception:
1970- 1976*
Willem J. M. Levelt
1. AIMS
T h e  fundamental problem in psycholinguistics is simple to formulate: what 
happens when we understand sentences?’ (Johnson-Laird, 143). T h e  problem of 
when and how a sentence is understood is, in my view, the central problem of 
experimental psycholinguistics’ (Gough, 109). ‘How do we understand the 
relevant meaning of sentences used in ordinary contexts? This is a central 
problem in psychology and a primary preoccupation of the psycholinguist’ 
(Tanenhaus et al. 244). These and many similar statements in the literature 
place the problem of sentence understanding at the very centre of psycho­
linguistics. The construction of a theory of sentence understanding is apparently 
expected to have spin-offs in various directions: the theory of language 
production, of language acquisition; it might even benefit cognitive psychology 
as a whole.
What, then, is the aim of a theory of sentence understanding? At this point 
authors are much less in agreement, or at least less explicit. In the early sixties 
the more or less implicit aim of constructing a theory of sentence under­
standing was to demonstrate the ‘psychological reality’ of linguistic notions, 
especially those developed in transformational linguistics. It is understandable 
in that light that such a theory was expected to stimulate developments in other 
areas of psycholinguistics as well. It is still an explicit purpose of many studies in 
language understanding to find out whether linguistic units are also relevant 
units in language processing. It has become abundantly clear, however, that 
proving ‘psychological reality’ of linguistic units and structures is too limited an 
aim for a theory of sentence understanding. Fodor et al. (80) convincingly show 
that reality studies have had only limited success. There is no doubt that such 
linguistic units and structures as words, constituents, and clauses show up in 
various experimental results; but generative rules, especially transformations, 
do not characterize processes of understanding. A major aim for a theory of
*T he  reader is referred to page 74 for a table of contents of this chapter.
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sentence understanding is, therefore, not so much to validate linguistic 
structures as to explain how such structures are created by the language user. 
Fodor et al. call these structures internal representations, and they identify these 
with what linguists call structural descriptions (cf. 80, p. 21). According to this 
view, the purpose of a theory of sentence understanding is to explain how the 
hearer uses his knowledge of the language to encode sentences in terms of ling­
uistic structural descriptions. Others describe the end product of understanding 
in non-linguistic terms. Schank (226), for instance, puts it this way: ‘a parser 
should associate a linguistic input with what we will call a conceptual structure. 
A conceptual structure consists of concepts and the relationship between them’. 
The end-term, therefore, is a non-linguistic object. The aim of the theory is to 
explain how a linguistic object (a text, sentence, etc.) is mapped onto a non-ling­
uistic object (a conceptual structure).
Many shades can be found between these two extremes (see, for instance, 
102), and one very common claim is that deriving a structural description is a 
first step in deriving a conceptual structure. Varieties of this claim will be 
discussed and criticized in section 4. Here, it is only important to notice that the 
theoretical aims are much broader in the latter framework than in the former. 
One is more inclined to look into the role of context, especially of non-linguistic 
context within the conceptual framework. Also, the role of encyclopaedic 
knowledge in sentence comprehension is generally recognized and given atten­
tion: one is strongly inclined to hypothesize top-down and concept-driven 
parsing procedures. The former, more linguistic approach, being more limited 
in its aims, also tends to be more local. But in this way it has led to thorough 
analyses of syntactic and bottom-up procedures in sentence understanding.
Apart from this range of theoretical aims, authors vary in the degree to which 
they stress the importance of analysing the interaction between speaker and 
listener in the study of sentence comprehension. Hôrmann (135) defines under­
standing as ‘making sense at a point intended by the speaker’. How the listener 
manages to find out what the speaker’s intentions are has increasingly become a 
more central aim for many researchers in recent years. Speech-act theory has 
captured the imagination of experimental psychologists. Clark (this volume) 
puts it this way: ‘comprehension is conceived to be the process by which people 
arrive at the interpretation the speaker intended  them to grasp for that utterance 
in that context’. And though the inference of such intentions is hard to study 
experimentally, Marslen-Wilson (186) explicitly defines it as an aim for the 
study of sentence perception: ‘The normal listener . . .  is a participant in a social 
event, trying to interpret the utterances he hears in terms of the communicative 
intentions of the speakers in question. Even if we cannot fully reproduce this 
situation under laboratory conditions, we can still try to capture, in our investi­
gations of sentence perception, its essential goal-directed and dynamic 
properties’.
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So, in summary, the tasks which students of sentence perception have set 
themselves are at least threefold; let us call them linguistic, conceptual, and 
communicative. It is obvious that these aims are not mutually exclusive, and as a 
matter of fact it is hard to find studies that are pure cases of any of these three 
approaches, as will become clear in the course of this review.
What, then, is the aim of this review? Since the pioneering work of the sixties, 
the experimental study of sentence perception has had an explosive develop­
ment in the seventies, which led to such an extensive literature that compre­
hensive reviews are available only for particular subfields and are mostly to be 
found in unpublished doctoral dissertations. It therefore seemed useful to 
collect a major part of the experimental literature from 1970 to 1976 and to 
analyse it with respect to method, results, and theory. In order not to be 
inundated by our material, it was necessary to place some severe restrictions on 
the review. Firstly, except for a few important manuscripts, only published 
material was taken into account. Secondly, the review ends at 31 December, 
1976. Though many new findings about active research topics have been made 
since the end of 1976, it was not feasible to expect comprehensiveness of treat­
ment for the first months of 1977; moreover, one has to stop somewhere. 
Thirdly, we have been strict on limiting ourselves to studies of sentence 
perception. Thus, on the one hand we have not reviewed studies o f j e x t  
.comprehension, word recognition, word verification, or phoneme perception. 
On the other hand, studies of sentence memory7"oFsentencej r o d u c t io n lhave 
also been left out. FourfhlyTwe ha veTefr ou FT he w h o 1 e neurophysiological and
aphasia literature. Fifthly, we have not incorporated the massive literature on 
reading. Sixthly, we have been forced to mention only in passing many 
studies—but such is the fate of all reviewers. We have been especially short on 
issues which are treated in other chapters of this volume. Finally, some 
omissions have occurred in spite of the effort to be comprehensive: the meshes of 
our net have apparently been too large here and there. But it may also be noted 
in this respect, that one had to be realistic and stop somewhere, apologizing to 
the fish that escaped.
The review is organized in the following way. Section 2 deals with experi­
mental procedures in the study of sentence perception, because it became more 
and more clear to us that thorough analyses of experimental tasks and 
dependent measures are a necessary requirement for evaluating experimental 
results and theories. Section 3 deals with the independent variables, the 
linguistic and non-linguistic factors which have been manipulated to study their 
effects on sentence perception. It is especially here that variation in theoretical 
aims becomes apparent. Section 4, finally, is fully devoted to these theoretical 
issues.
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2. TASKS AND DEPENDENT VARIABLES
Psycholinguists have been highly inventive in the development of experimental 
procedures (for a recent review see Olson and Clark, 205). The variety of experi­
mental tasks whichTsubjects have had to perform in studies of language percep­
tion is remarkable: „click localization, dichotic switch localization, recall,
n x - I -  r  1  1  « V « »  K  ,  ^  I. .
completion, verification, paraphrasing, translation, judging comprehensibility 
or grammaticality, phoneme-monitoring, shadowing, etc. This productivity has 
its drawbacks, however. One cannot rid oneself of the impression that 
techniques are trademarks for research groups. This is especially clear in cases 
where different techniques are used to study basically the same theoretical issue. 
The issue of perceptual segmentation, for instance, has led one group (around 
Bever) to use clTclc-localization tasks, another group (around Foss) to use 
phoneme-monitoring, a third group (around Wanner) to use a transient 
memory-load procedure, etc. Studies in which different methods are applied to 
the same material are very limited and tend to be rather inconclusive. As a 
consequence results obtained by different techniques have until now been less 
than cumulative. In this section procedures will be categorized into two major 
groups. The first group involves procedures where measurement takes place 
during reception of the stimulus, i.e. during the presentation to the subject of a 
clause, sentence, etc. These techniques will be called simultaneous measure­
ment. One example is measuring pupil diameter while the subject listens to a 
sentence. The second group consists of procedures where measurement takes 
place after presentation of the stimulus. This will be denoted as successive 
measurement. An example is immediate recall of the stimulus. This distinction is 
important, since only in the first case can one be sure that results arise as a 
consequence of the input process, i.e. are strictly perceptual. In the latter case 
reconstruction activities, and therefore factors such as response bias, may 
codetermine the results. The results are perceptual only in the broad sense that 
they concern the way the subject reacts to a perceptual stimulus, and it is much 
harder, although not necessarily impossible, to determine in which phase of 
stimulus processing the experimental variable is effective.
It is quite simple to partition most techniques into these two classes, but a 
further qualification has to be made for a particular set of methods, those which 
can be called ‘subsidiary task methods'. Here, the subject has as a main task to 
interpret the verbal material, and as a subsidiary task to attend to something else 
in the mean time. Examples are click-localization and phoneme-monitoring
-  ______________  _ J W  ■ ■ > > l  ■  '  "  » 1 1  ■  I I ------- --------- -
experiments. Though the subsidiary stimulus is given during input of the test- 
stimulus, measurement can be either simultaneous or successive. Rhoneme- 
monitoring is simultaneous since an immediate reaction to the subsidiary 
stimulus (the phoneme) is required. Click localization is successive, since the 
subject’s response is given only after the full sentence has been presented. Subsid­
iary methods, therefore, fall within both main groups.
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2.1 Simultaneous measurement
Three major ways of simultaneous measurement are in use: subsidiary task 
methods (which in simultaneous measurement are always monitoring methods), 
shadowing, and psychophysiological measurement.
2.1.1 Subsidiary task methods
d u r i n g  presentation of a word list, sentence, or text, the subject has to attend to 
the stimulus and at the same time to monitor for a particular test stimulus. (It is 
often only assumed that the subject attends to the sentence or text, without 
explicitly instructing him to do so.) This test stimulus can either be part of the 
verbal material, such as a particular syllable (191,222), word (1,249), or 
phoneme, or it may be an additional stimulus such as a light flash (272) or a 
click. The subject’s task is always to react immediately to the test stimulus; 
reaction time is the dependent variable. Here we will give some attention to 
phoneme-monitoring and click-monitoring.
(i) Phoneme-monitoring. This technique was introduced by Foss and Lynch 
(92) in a study where subjects had to listen to a self-embedding or right- 
branching sentence which was followed by a comprehension test. Apart from 
understanding the sentence, subjects had the subsidiary task of pressing a 
reaction key as soon as they heard a word with / b/ as the initial phoneme. The 
authors, hypothesized the existence of a fixed-capacity decision mechanism 
(something like a working memory) where different decision-making processes 
have to share time. Difficulty of decision with respect to syntactic processing will 
therefore delay reaction to the test phoneme. Such difficulty was predicted for 
certain positions in self-embedded sentences. The authors found longer RTs for 
self-embedding than for right-branching sentences, provided the target 
phoneme appeared rather late in the sentence. Several phoneme-monitoring 
studies by Foss and his colleagues have followed this initial study (36, 37, 84,87, 
88, 91, 1 17, 118, 1 19, 120, see also 157). At this place we shall only discuss some 
issues related to the technique itself; the theoretical content of these studies will 
be treated in sections 3 and 4. A major issue is whether phoneme detection can be 
considered as an independent process, only competing for limited capacity. This 
was the original assumption, but after Savin and Bever’s (222) finding that 
monitoring for a syllable is quicker than monitoring for its initial phoneme, Foss 
and Swinney (93) shifted to the assumption that the phoneme is identified after 
first analysing the word, i.e. word or syllable recognition is a condition for 
phoneme detection. Morton and Long (201) show that this is not a necessary con­
clusion: phoneme detection can be relatively slow because of greater response 
inertia. But still, phoneme-monitoring reaction times are also sensitive to factors 
affecting recognition of the word to which the phoneme belongs. One such 
factor is transitional probability between the preceding word and the target
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word. Morton and Long showed that this factor alone could induce a 70 msec 
variation in phoneme-detection time. This finding in itself necessitates caution 
in interpreting phoneme-monitoring results in all cases where this factor has not 
been controlled. It also sheds new light on experiments where the frequency of 
the preceding word affected monitoring reaction times (36, 87). If word recog­
nition is a condition for phoneme detection, the target word’s frequency itself 
should also be an important factor. The fact that several studies use different 
target words (with the same target phoneme) at different test positions in the 
sentence, makes this a major uncontrolled factor. There is not a single study 
known to this author which measured the effect of variations in target-word 
frequency.
A further, little understood, factor, which is probably a context variable that 
indirectly affects phoneme detection (through target-word identification) is the 
position of the target word in the sentence. Three studies (37, 87, 117) show 
relatively short RTs where the target word occurs relatively late in the sentence 
as opposed to early; two other studies (92, 120) show the inverse effect. Various 
factors can be involved here: transition probability, syntactic category of 
preceding word (see 37), increasing expectation, increasing processing load, 
response bias, intonational level, etc. (see especially 67), and rhythmic structure 
of the sentence (190, 233). Some of these factors are studied in a word- 
monitoring study by Marslen-Wilson and Tyler (187).
A final variable which has not been taken into account is the acoustical shape 
and environment of the phoneme. It is certain that in nearly all studies the target 
phoneme is not acoustically identical in different test positions. Moreover, its 
acoustical environment is also never controlled. Thus, variations in pitch, 
coarticulations, loudness, and so forth make it impossible to maintain that 
phoneme-monitoring studies provide the listener with physically constant test 
stimuli. The present dilemma for the phoneme-monitoring technique can be 
stated briefly as follows: either phoneme detection is an independent process 
competing for limited processing capacity, or phoneme detection is dependent 
on target-word identification and analysis. In the case of the former (and rather 
unlikely) alternative, it is essential to keep the physical stimulus and its 
immediate environment constant.- This is hardly possible with phonemes as 
stimuli. In the second (more likely) case, one is essentially measuring word 
recognition. It is not only important, then, to control such nuisance variables as 
word frequency and transitional probability, but also to decide whether it would 
not make more sense to replace the indirect phoneme-monitoring by the more 
direct word-monitoring. The answer to that question will depend on the 
effectiveness with which one can control semantic and syntactic expectations in 
word-monitoring paradigms.
(u) Click-monitoring. The subject presses or releases a key after detecting a 
click during presentation of a sentence. Abrams and Bever (3) introduced this
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method with an argument similar to the one used by Foss and Lynch:-detection 
of click and processing of the sentence are in competition for limited attentional 
capacity. If understanding is heavily loading the system, then detection will be 
relatively impaired. In retrospect we see that this initial study was merely 
exploratory; it was beset with experimental shortcomings (see 241), some of 
which also affected Holmes and Forster’s study (130). (This latter paper seemed 
to show that RTs to clicks are relatively long in the midst of a clause.) The study 
by Streeter and Bever (241) controlled for relative frequency, transitional 
probability, acoustic shape, etc. A major finding was quicker RTs to clicks at the 
beginning of a clause than at the end, in correspondence with the attentional 
theory. An equivalent word-monitoring task tended to give the inverse effect: 
reactions to end-of-clause words were relatively quick.
The authors’ interpretation is that the word, as an integrated part of the 
clause, is receiving attention contrary to the click. This conclusion makes it 
urgent to use the Streeter and Bever sentences in a phoneme-monitoring task. If 
phoneme detection is dependent on target-word identification and analysis 
(which as we have seen is rather likely), phoneme-monitoring should follow the 
word-monitoring results and not the click-monitoring results. Such a finding 
would be in good agreement with the close parallelism which Marslen-Wilson 
and Tyler (187) found between word-monitoring and rhyme-monitoring.
Bever and Hurtig (24) compared the Streeter and Bever (241) RT findings for 
supraliminal clicks, with detection for clicks at threshold. This is an essentially 
successive measurement situation, and response bias resulting from processing 
the whole sentence could affect the subject’s yes/no decision which is given after 
the sentence. Though the results are compatible with those of Streeter and 
Bever, they should be interpreted with caution: inverted speech was used to 
control for acoustic masking by the sentence, a procedure based on the 
erroneous experimental assumption that forward-masking equals backward- 
masking. Click-monitoring is simultaneous measurement, as opposed to click 
localization (see section 2.2.1) and liminal click detection. Moreover, it is not 
beleaguered with most of the phoneme-monitoring problems. It is therefore 
surprising that click-monitoring has not been more widely used. Flores d’Arcais’ 
(77) contribution to this volume gives further evidence of its usefulness.
2.1.2 Shadowing
Shadowing, i.e. the subject’s repeating an acoustically presented sentence or 
text, insofar as possible in an on-line fashion, has been highly popular in former 
years. However, only a few studies since 1970 have made use of the technique. 
Rosenberg and Jarvella (216, 217) showed an effect of semantic integration of 
sentences on shadowing latency under noise conditions. Shadowing of word 
lists is used by Treisman, Squire, and Green (250) in order to test findings by 
Lewis (176), Garrett (101), and MacKay (182), regarding the semantic effects of
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words heard in the unattended ear on the interpretation of words heard in the 
attended ears. Treisman et al. (250) cast doubt on models postulating full lexical 
analysis of unattended words. Darwin (69) extends this work to sentences in 
order to study the effect of prosody. Marslen-Wilson (184, 185) used shadowing 
in order to demonstrate that so-called ‘close-shadowers’, who performed with a 
delay of about one syllable, were highly sensitive to syntactic and semantic 
aspects of the text. This demonstrates the immediacy of the syntactic and 
semantic processes during sentence processing. The origin of delays or errors in 
shadowing is not always self-evident. They can be due to a strictly perceptual 
failure or to complex difficulties in response selection.
2.1.3 Psychophysiological measurement
Psychophysiological studies of sentence processing are very much at an 
exploratory stage. Wright and Kahneman (273) studied pupil size as a measure 
o f ‘mental load’ in tasks where the subject listened to a sentence, recalled it, or 
answered questions about it. Though results clearly indicated that effort was 
positively correlated with pupil size, no effects of phrase structure were found. It 
should be noted, however, that the experimental sentences, though complex, 
were essentially of a one-clause type. Two-clause sentences were used in a study 
by Abrams and Bever (3) in which the listener received slight electric shocks at 
critical points in the sentence. Galvanic skin responses were measured and 
turned out to be relatively strong for shocks occurring at the end of a clause. 
Unlike the pupil-size method, which does not interfere with the normal under­
standing process, the shock procedure is likely to divert the subject’s attention 
from the syntactic material; it is probably the size of this orientation reaction 
which is reflected in GSR. This reviewer is unfamiliar with any follow-up study 
of these interesting beginnings.
2.2 Successive measurement
Studies on language perception using successive measurement outnumber, by a 
factor of about six, those using simultaneous measurement. It is impossible to 
review all the technical variations developed by inventive researchers. We will 
limit ourselves to the major types: subsidiary tasks, recall, recognition, para­
phrasing, verification and question answering.
2.2.1 Subsidiary task methods
Apart from attending to the sentence, the subject has to attend to other simul­
taneously occurring events, but he is required to report on these only after the 
verbal stimulus has disappeared. The major method here is click localization; 
two other techniques are dichotic switch localization, and transient memory­
load measurement.
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(i) Click localization. Ladefoged and Broadbent (166) made subjects listen to 
a spolcen message. The subjects had difficulty in locating the position of a short 
burst of noise (a ‘click’) which was presented during the message. The authors 
used the technique to determine perceptual units in the message. The subject’s 
localization judgment would depend on what for him would have been a 
perceptual unit. In the psycholinguistic experimentation of the sixties, there was 
a real hunt for methods which could establish the ‘psychological reality’ of 
linguistic entities. The click procedure was discovered (79,100) as an almost god- 
given measure to prove the perceptual reality of constituents, and /o r  clauses. 
Everybody’s imagination was caught when it was observed that subjects were 
better at locating clicks presented in major constituent boundaries (79,104) than 
at locating those presented just before or after such boundaries. Moreover, 
mislocations in the latter cases were more often than not in the direction of the 
boundaries. In short, boundaries ‘attracted’ clicks. At this point we will limit 
ourselves to a discussion of some of the technical questions which arose after the 
first euphoria subsided.
Let us recapitulate the original purpose of the click studies. They should show
(a) the ‘psychological reality’ of certain linguistic units and (b) that this reality is 
strictly perceptual, i.e. that these units have their effect during input of the 
sentence.
With respect to (a), the main experimental problem was to disentangle the ling­
uistic variable (i.e. the clause-boundary position) from other, often covarying, 
factors. The following covarying factors have been studied for their possible 
effects on click mislocation: serial position of the click in the sentence (21, 209), 
intonational pattern (210), and transitional probability (26). All these factors 
affected click localization, but for each of these factors it could be shown that the 
clause-boundary effect can occur if the factor is neutralized (see 21, and 25 for 
serial position; 104 for intonational pattern, and 26 and 104 for transitional prob­
ability). What has not been tried so far is to control for all these factors at the 
same time. One might still argue that even if one factor is neutralized, the click 
displacement is caused by one of the other factors, not by a ‘pure’ clause 
boundary effect. Thus, for instance, in a very careful study on response bias (23), 
which will be discussed later, the displacement effect could have been fully 
caused by intonation instead of by the clause boundary. The only way to control 
for all factors at the same time is to use the splicing method (as in 241). The study 
by Garrett et al. (104) comes the closest to this ideal
Before treating the second issue of the perceptual origin of the effect, we 
should mention various additional factors which have been shown to affect click 
position. These factors, however, do not normally covary with clause-boundary 
position. Bertelson and Tisseyre (16) showed that prior knowledge of the 
sentence reduces preplacement of the click, and that separation of the click and 
sentence in acoustic space affected the degree of preplacement of the click (17). 
This effect apparently depends on reading direction, since in Hebrew it is inverse
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(15). This spatial separation effect is not due to the response mode (written or 
oral report of click position, 18); it can explain the fact that negative displace­
ment of the click is strongest if the speech is in the right ear and the click in the 
left ear (25, 26). Finally, click localization is more accurate (i.e. there is less of a 
clause-boundary effect) if the subject is free to ignore the contents of the 
sentence (see 21, 23, 229), especially if he is not required to recall, but receives a 
written version of the sentence on which to mark the click position (as in 16,209, 
210). This could not be verified in 131.
With respect to the second issue, regarding the perceptual origin of the click- 
displacement phenomenon, the click-localization technique shares the disadvan­
tage of all successive measurement tasks: the effect arises somewhere between 
the initiation of the sentence and the subject’s response, and it is hard to find out 
exactly where. Since the localization response usually occurs several seconds
,, '¡m
after presentation of the sentence, there is good reason to consider whether the 
mechanism of response selection is partly or wholly responsible for the click 
shifts. We will in the following pages go into some detail in order to demonstrate 
that even with sophisticated experimentation it is extremely troublesome to 
argue for the (strictly) perceptual origin of a phenomenon on the basis of a 
successive measurement technique, be it click localization or anything else. The 
obvious way to check for response selection factors is to compare real click locali­
zation with ‘click localization’ when no click is presented. Ladefoged (165) was 
the first to try this out in an exploratory way; it was followed by an equally 
exploratory study by Reber and Anderson (210).
The first experiment systematically measuring the distribution of guessing 
bias was Reber’s (209). It revealed a rather dramatic guessing effect: subjects 
clearly preferred to locate the non-existent click in or around the major syntactic 
break. This is the case in spite of the fact that subjects are not requested to recall 
the sentence, so that one would expect such results a fortiori if the subject were 
also set to actually recall the sentence. When this was tested by Bever et al. (23), 
the results were negative: they found only a small effect of clause break for the 
‘subliminal’ click condition. The graph of their results shows that there is a bias 
to locate the non-existent click either a half-syllable before the break or in the 
break. But the attraction of breaks is significantly stronger in the real-click situa­
tion, although there is also in this case a bias towards preposing the click. It is 
certainly correct to conclude from these results that the clause-boundary effect is 
stronger for real clicks that for non-existent clicks, and therefore that since 
guessing cannot fully explain the click-displacement effect, something more 
strictly perceptual is also involved. It cannot be concluded, however, that this 
perceptual factor is the clause boundary se. In this experiment, clause break 
was contaminated with intonation, and it therefore could have been a perceptual 
effect of intonation alone (which has been shown to be an important variable; 
see 210). The fact that Bever et al. (23) found a lesser effect for guessing than 
Reber did (209) needs explanation. The recall set in Bever’s study as opposed to
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Reber’s is difficult to interpret as a possible cause since Reber found strong 
guessing-bias effects in a situation where no recall was required. It is not clear 
why this bias should disappear if the subject is forced to attend to the contents of 
the sentence. There are additional differences between Reber’s and Bever’s 
experiments which should be explored in more detail. The first possible cause of 
this difference is that Reber used ‘normal intonation’, whereas Bever e/ al. used 
‘monotone intonation’. In view of the strong effect of intonation on click locali­
zation (210), this experimental difference is worth a further check. The second 
possible cause is to be sought in the number of response alternatives. Reber’s 
subjects could localize the non-existent click at any position in the sentence, i.e. 
at any of 25 possible locations (within and between syllables). Bever et al. gave 
their subjects a ‘window’; that is, a limited region on the typed-out sentence 
within which the click should be located. This region contained nine possible 
positions. If one now looks at the clausal break and the two immediately 
adjacent positions, one will see that they make up 12% of the possible positions 
in Reber’s case, and 33% in Bever’s. Reber found 33.8% (subliminal) click 
localizations in this region and Bever 52%—in both cases substantially more 
than could be expected on a non-bias basis. The fact that Bever’s curves are less 
‘peaked’ than Reber’s can therefore be partly due to the window technique: the 
subjects have to ‘pile up’ their responses in a limited region. A final difference 
between the two experiments may have worked the other way. Reber used a 
control group for his ‘subliminal’ click condition, whereas Bever et al. used click 
and non-click conditions mixed within subjects. In their experiment the 
response window for the subject was always centred around the real click 
position; the subject might therefore conclude that this was always the case, and 
apply this knowledge in the non-click condition; i.e. he might position the click 
in the middle of the window on the answer sheet. This would have favoured the 
break ±  1 positions.
In summary, it has been shown that a great many factors can influence click 
localization, some of them presumably affecting early stages of the decision­
making process (especially intonation). The experiments showing an early 
origin of the clause-break factor contaminate this factor with other factors; on 
the other hand, clause break also seems to have an (early or late) effect of its own 
if it is uncontaminated.
(ii) Dichotic switch localization. This method was introduced by Wingfield 
and Klein (267). The subject listens to the sentence dichotically. The sentence 
starts out in one ear, and at some point switches to the other ear. It is the 
subject’s task to localize the switching point after he has heard the sentence. The 
method is very much akin to the click-localization technique, and in fact it gives 
very similar results. Wingfield (266) and Wingfield and Klein (267) used the tape- 
splicing method of Garrett et al. (104), which is an effective control for prosody
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and transitional probability. An example is given in the following sentence pair 
( 1) and (2):
( 1) Besides commercial uses o f  colour movies , they are simply enjoyable;
(2) Among the commercial uses o f  colour, movies are most typical,
where the middle part of the sentence can be spliced into the other sentence.
Results showed that switch localization was more accurate if the switch 
coincided with the clause boundary. However, this was the case only if prosody
‘agreed’ with the clause structure (i.e. in unspliced sentences). If clause structure 
conflicted with the prosodic pattern (i.e. in the spliced versions), there was no 
significant clause-boundary effect, only a significant effect of prosody. 
Wingfield also found, in agreement with the click studies (21, 23, 229), that 
localization is more accurate if the subject is not required to recall the sentence. 
In conclusion, there is also here at most a very slight effect of clause boundary, 
but a strong effect if it coincides with prosodic pause. Darwin (69) used 
sentences similar to Wingfield and Klein’s (i.e. normal and cross-spliced 
sentences) in a dichotic switch situation where the subject did not have to 
indicate the switch position but simply to write down the sentence. Darwin 
analysed errors as a function of switch location in the sentence. Cross-spliced 
sentences led to substantially more syntactic errors, but not to more lexical 
errors. Errors near the intonational boundary had highest rates if an 
intonational boundary preceded (rather than followed) a major syntactic 
boundary. We will return to this finding in section 3.1.
Can one control for response bias in the switch-localization technique? Flores 
d’Arcais (see his paper in this volume) has managed to do so by presenting both 
parts of the sentence to both ears while manipulating the loudness balance 
between the ears: a switch is then perceived as a small ‘shift in the head’ of the 
message. In this manner fake shifts can be interspersed (by not affecting the 
balance at all) in order to measure response bias effects.
(Hi) Transient memory-load. Savin and Perchonock (223) measured the 
mental load of incoming syntactical material by additionally giving the subject 
(either just before or just after the sentence) a short word list to remember. The 
number of recalled words was supposed to be an indication of the spare STM 
capacity during the processing of the sentence. Foss and Cairns (90) used this 
technique to show that recall of complex sentences was worse than recall of 
simple sentences if the subject’s first task was to remember the word list. Wanner 
and Shiner (261; see also 259, 260, 262) extended this method in the following 
way: a sentence is presented visually word by word. The sequence is interrupted 
at some (test) position for presentation of a short list of words to be 
remembered; after this the sentential sequence continues. The subject’s task is
(i) to comprehend the sentence and (ii) to remember the list of words. Wanner
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and Shiner (261) showed the validity of the technique on a visually presented 
arithmetic task. Wanner et al. (259, 260, 262) used it in psycholinguistic experi­
ments, especially to test predictions from an Augmented Transition Network 
(ATN) model (see section 4.3.2) of sentence parsing. In these experiments the 
authors use a combined comprehension plus recall score as their load measure, a 
concession which expresses the feeling that the situation is not really one of a 
main plus an additional task but one of two main tasks. The combined measure, 
however, is quite sensitive. A major disadvantage for study of sentence 
perception is the unnatural character of the presentation: a slow word-by-word 
presentation combined with a major interruption. It is likely that the perceptual 
process itself is also slowed down, and is quite different from the process which 
occurs in normal listening.
2.2.2 Recall
Recall is an obvious procedure to be used in the study of memory. 
Psycholinguistic studies of memory of sentences are very numerous (see 172), 
and various recall methods have been used for this purpose.-Here we will limit 
ourselves to studies where the researcher’s interest was basically in sentence 
perception but where some form of recall was used in the experiments. Many of 
these studies have been designed to show that a certain variable affects the 
subject’s processing of verbal material, without much concern for the particular 
stage between stimulus presentation and recall at which the variable 
accomplished this. These are often loosely referred to as studies in 
comprehension. Examples are Bransford and Johnson (32) and Frederikson 
(96), who used free recall to study the effect of context on the understanding of 
text. Both studies claim that the effect of context is located somewhere in the 
encoding process, not in the recall phase. Only the first study systematically 
varies context before or after the prose passage. Results show that context 
placed before is much more effective, which certainly makes it likely that context 
is helpful during reading in these cases. Kintsch et al. (158) varied the number of 
word concepts in a text and found an effect on recall; the variable also affected 
reading time, indicating that it might operate during encoding. In other studies 
more specific perceptual claims are made, and they invariably lead to more 
difficulties in interpretation. A typical example is Levelt’s (169) experiment 
where subjects were presented with sentences embedded in white noise; after 
each sentence they had to write down what they had heard. The data were 
analysed in terms of conditional probabilities that word j  would be reproduced 
when given that earlier word / had been reproduced, for all words i and j  in the 
sentence. In this way it was possible to show that the data structure was strongly
hierarchical, and it was concluded that ‘hierarchical left-to-right chunking will 
often be an adequate model for sentence processing’. It is not at all certain, how­
ever, that the hierarchical structure reflects the way in which the sentence is
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chunked during presentation. Loosen (179) repeated this experiment with one 
change. He presented the sentences with their word order scrambled, but asked 
the subjects to reproduce these word lists in the form of a sentence (if possible). 
The data were very similar to Levelt’s, even though the subjects could not have 
chunked the words in the way hypothesized in that study. The hierarchical 
structure must have resulted during a complicated storage or retrieval process. 
(Kempen, 155, could show that it is in fact a retrieval effect.) Of course this does 
not prove that the original conclusion was wrong, but it certainly shows that it 
was insufficiently motivated. Dooling (72) used a similar technique to Levelt’s in 
a study where subjects were set for a particular rhythmic and /o r  surface 
structure. Only change of rhythm had a (major) effect on subject’s sentence 
reproduction, and it appeared quite likely that rhythmic expectations enhance 
perceptual efficiency. Still, it is not impossible that the subject’s response 
selection is facilitated by a given rhythmic structure. If a perceived element is not 
quickly read out of STM it may be lost, and reading out may be hampered 
by a change in the response rhythm. An experiment of Forster (84), using 
immediate sentence reproduction in combination with a rapid visual 
presentation technique, did control for the possibility of losing a perceived 
element from STM. (The technique of rapid serial visual presentation, RSVP, 
involves a quick word-by-word presentation of the sentence in such a way that 
successive words are centred at the same visual localization.) Here, subjects were 
requested to monitor for a word beginning with a particular pair of letters. 
Subjects performed better at monitoring than at recall. This indicates that in the 
recall of rapidly presented sentences, perceived elements may get lost during 
retrieval from STM. A recall technique alone is insufficient for deciding on the 
stage where the effect arises. Carpenter (43) combines the technique with a 
verification reaction-time procedure.
Immediate recall is also used in the experiments by Jarvella et a/. (140, 141, 
142), but here the purpose is rather different. Jarvella gave a spoken (142) or 
written (141) text to his subjects; it was interrupted at some point and the 
subjects’ task was to recall immediately as much of the text as they could. A 
major finding was that verbatim recall was at a high level for the last clause 
and/ or sentence only. In this way Jarvella could distinguish between stages of 
comprehension: the earlier material had already been interpreted and only the 
last clause or sentence was still available in verbatim, uninterpreted form. Here 
also, control was necessary to exclude retrieval as the sole explanation for the 
findings. It could be that the subject started out by reproducing the last clause 
and only thereafter went back to earlier material. This time-lag might explain 
the results, but Jarvella controlled for such a possibility in an experiment in 
which subjects were presented with prompt words and were requested to recall 
from that point on. The results corroborated the earlier ones: a prompt word 
was most effective if it had been selected from the final clause. Jarvella’s 
experiments have been extended by Marslen-Wilson and Tyler (188), to whom 
we will return (section 4.1.2). For a similar method, see 211.
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2.2.3 Recognition
Retrieval processes which are always at work in recall tasks are less important in 
recognition tasks. A good example is Caplan’s (38) study where a word-recog- 
nition test followed the presentation of a sentence. The subjects’ task was to 
judge whether the word had occurred in the sentence, and reaction time was 
measured. The results confirm very well Jarvella’s recall findings (141, 142): the 
last clause has a substantially higher verbatim availability. See also Kornfeld 
(161) for replication and extension of these findings.
Larger units, such as complete sentences, have also been used in recognition 
tests. The classic study here is by Sachs (212), who gave her subjects a story in 
which a critical active or passive sentence had been embedded. The story was 
followed by a recognition test for either the same sentence of its transformed 
version. If the sentence was the last sentence in the story, recognition was close 
to perfect; but if the critical sentence had occurred earlier in the story, 
recognition went down to about 60%. This shows, again in agreement with 
Jarvella’s findings, that the verbatim version of a sentence is quickly lost. 
Anderson and Bower (5, 7) have used and extended Sachs’ technique with 
essentially similar findings. A signal-detection analysis of Sachs-type data can 
be found in 235. Although reconstructive retrieval processes are probably 
eliminated in recognition experiments, they share the disadvantage of all 
successive measurement techniques that it is impossible to differentiate input 
explanations from storage explanations. How was the sentence registered in 
memory, and how well was it kept there? It is likely that in all the above 
experiments recognition failure resulted from forgetting, not from failure to 
detect in the first place. But only independent detection tests, such as Forster’s 
(84), can be decisive in this respect.
Finally, caution is needed with the often implicit assumption that recognition 
equals recall minus reconstruction. Carey and Lockhart (41) show for word lists 
that subjects employ different encoding operations, dependent on whether they 
expect a recognition task or a recall task (see 251 for a similar result). Nothing is 
known about whether the same task dependency is operative in sentence or text 
comprehension.
2.2.4 Paraphrasing
Though paraphrasing tasks are often used for the sole purpose of forcing the 
subject to interpret the sentence, there are some studies where paraphrasing, 
especially paraphrasing reaction time and accuracy, is used to determine the 
perceptual complexity of a sentence. Examples are the studies by Fodor et al. 
(80, 83), where among other variables self-embedding and verb complexity were 
shown to affect paraphrasing accuracy and reaction time. Just as with the recall 
studies, it is ambiguous at which stage between stimulus and response the 
variable is effective. Hakes (117) writes ‘Paraphrasing seems to require that the S
Table 1.1 Paraphrase and phonem e-m oni to r ing  results in relative p ronoun  deletion,  self-embedding, 
and com plem en t- tha t  deletion
Dependent  variable
Independen t
variable
Paraphrase
Authors Ph .m on .RT Acc. RT A cc /R T Sent, compl.
F odo r  and Garre t t  
(1967)
Rel. p ronoun  
deletion
0 0 0 + 0
Fodor ,  Garre t t  and 
Bever (1968)
Verb s truc tu re 0 + -- 0 0
Foss and Lynch  
(1969)
Right branching 
vs self-embedd.
0 + 0 0 +
Rel. p ronoun  
deletion
0 * 0 0
Freedle and Craun 
(1970)
Degree of  
self-e mb
0 + 0 0 0
Hakes and Cairns 
(1970)
H a k e s (1971)
Rel. p ronoun  
deletion
Verb s t ruc tu re
+ + 0 0
Expt  1 -- + 0 0 0
H a k e s (1972)
Expt  2
That-de le t ion  
in com plem en t :
0 0 0
E xp t  1, Easy 
sentences
+ 0 • 0 0
E xp t  2, Diff. 
sentences
+ + 0 0 0
Hakes and Foss 
(1 9 7 0 )
Relative p ro n o u n  
dele t ion
+ -- 0 0 0
0 dependent variable not tested.
+ dependent variable tested and significantly affected.
-  dependent variable tested and not significantly affected.
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at least: ( 1) comprehend the presented sentence; and (2) by modifying the 
sentence’s lexical content an d /o r  structure, construct another sentence that is 
roughly synonymous. Thus, while a paraphrasing error might reflect a 
comprehension failure, it might also reflect a failure occurring during the 
construction of the paraphrase’. Hakes et al. in a series of papers (117, 118, 119, 
120) tested some of the original Fodor et al. variables comparatively in para­
phrasing and phoneme-monitoring tasks. The results of these and some similar 
studies are summarized in Table 1.1. These results are at best confusing. 
Relative pronoun deletion has been studied in three experiments. Fodor and 
Garrett (82) measured both paraphrasing accuracy (Acc) and paraphrase delay 
(RT). They expressed their data in Acc/RT. If one reads their text carefully it 
appears that in at least one experiment delay itself is significantly affected by the 
variables. Foss and Lynch (92) used two other dependent measures, phoneme- 
monitoring and sentence completion. Neither showed an effect of relative 
pronoun deletion. Hakes and Cairns (119), finally, found significant effects on 
phoneme-monitoring RT and paraphrasing accuracy, but not on paraphrase 
delay. Thus, each dependent variable showed an effect in just one study. Verb 
structure was manipulated in two studies. Fodor et al. (83) found an effect on 
paraphrasing accuracy, but not on paraphrase delay. Hakes (117) found an 
effect on paraphrasing accuracy in one experiment, but not in the other, and no 
effects on phoneme-monitoring. Degree of self-embedding was manipulated in 
two studies, using different dependent variables: phoneme-monitoring and 
sentence completion in Foss and Lynch (92) and paraphrasing accuracy in 
Freedle and Craun (97). All showed significant effects. These and the other 
results on Table 1.1 show that paraphrase delay, paraphrase accuracy, and 
phoneme-monitoring behave quite independently and differently for different 
variables. Thus, there is no basis for the strong generalizations that can be found 
in some of these papers.
2.2.5 Verification
In a typical verification experiment, the subject is presented with a sentence and 
is asked to verify its truth with respect to some other source of information (a 
picture, another sentence, or pre-existing knowledge of the world). There are 
two dependent variables, reaction time and error rate. Mostly (but not always; 
see 137), reaction time is the critical variable. It is used to discover or test 
processing stages mediating between stimulus and response. The basic assump­
tion is Donders’ (71) notion that a response is the result of a linear sequence of 
operations, with each operation taking a certain amount of time, with these 
times being additive. Donders’ so-called subtraction method consisted of adding 
or removing an operation in the sequence and registering the resulting increase 
or decrease in RT. The difference would amount to the characteristic time for 
that operation. A much-used application of the subtraction method in sentence
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verification is the following. It is supposed that coping with a negative involves 
an independent operation. In order to measure its effect, negative sentences are 
compared with affirmative sentences and differences in RT are determined. 
More important than determining characteristic operation times is 
demonstrating that a certain operational stage is really independent. It has to be 
shown that the stage contributes to the RT independently of what happened in 
earlier or later stages.
In a very fundamental paper, Sternberg (238) extends Donders’ method in 
order to show the additivity and independence of processing stages; this is called 
the additive factor method. This method does not require the elimination of a 
processing stage but only the manipulation of the processing durations of each 
of the hypothesized stages. If two stages are supposed to be independent and 
successive, then it should be possible to find an experimental variable which 
specifically affects the duration of one stage but not the other, and inversely. 
Experimentally this should show up in the absence of an interaction between the 
factors in an analysis of variance (on the raw RT data). This confirms additivity 
but not necessarily independence. For independence it is, moreover, required 
that the higher cumulants of the RT distribution (i.e. variance, skewness, etc.) 
are also additively affected by the factors. Donders’ method is a limiting case of 
Sternberg’s in the sense that eliminating a stage is equal to reducing its 
processing duration to zero. Verification RT measurement, while successive in 
character, does not share all the disadvantages of other successive measurement 
techniques, but only by making additional assumptions. More specifically, one 
has to make assumptions about the successiveness, nature, and order of stages. 
If, for instance, a perceptual stage is hypothesized, then one can define an 
experimental variable which, by the nature of the stage, will affect its processing 
time. By manipulating the variable one can find out whether the stage is really 
independent and what its temporal characteristics are. Thus although neither 
Donders’ nor Sternberg’s method can decide on the order of stages, it is possible 
to hypothesize such an order on independent grounds and then to verify the 
model by choosing appropriate experimental variables in a factorial design. To 
take just one example, Banks, Clark, and Lucy (13) presented subjects with such 
questions as ‘Which balloon is higher/ lower?’ and ‘Which yoyo is higher/ lower?’ 
followed by a picture of two balloons tied up at different heights or of two yoyos
hanging down at different heights. The subject had to press the left or right 
reaction key in correspondence with the highest/lowest balloon or yoyo. The 
model is a two-stage model: a perceptual followed by a linguistic stage. At the 
perceptual stage the picture is registered. Various factors may specifically 
influence the duration of this stage. The authors selected as their experimental 
factor discriminability, i.e. difference in height of balloons (or yoyos). They used 
three levels for this factor. The linguistic stage is supposed to compare the 
perceptual output with the linguistic representation of the question sentence. A 
factor which might specifically affect the duration of this is the congruity
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between perceptual and linguistic code. If a balloon is perceptually coded in 
terms of ‘high’, and a yoyo in terms of ‘low’ (the authors’ hypothesis), the 
congruent question (‘Which balloon is higher’, ‘Which yoyo is lower?’) should be 
easier than the incongruent question (‘Which balloon is lower?’, 'Which yoyo is 
higher?’). It turns out that the two factors have additive effects on mean RT; 
there is no statistical interaction, testifying to the successiveness of the 
perceptual and the linguistic stage. The authors do not test the additivity of the 
higher moments of the RT-distribution; strictly speaking, therefore, the 
independence of the stages has not been shown. There is. however, not a single 
sentence verification study where the additivity of higher cumulants is 
analysed—a very general technical omission in these experiments. Otherwise, 
this study is an exemplary application of Sternberg’s method. If the two test 
factors do show statistical interaction, then one must reject the possibility that 
there are successive independent stages. The interpretation of the way in which 
the two processes interrelate, then, depends on whether the joint effects of the 
two experimental factors is super- or subadditive. Sternberg points out that 
superadditivity may indicate limited capacity sharing of two parallel processes, 
whereas subadditivity may indicate parallel processing where RT is determined 
by the slowest of the two operations. Krueger (162) did an experiment where 
subjects matched a short phrase (such as ‘is north’, ‘isn’t east’) with the position 
of a small circle with respect to the typed phrase (above, below, left, or right). He 
tested whether negation coding (‘isn’t’ versus ‘is’) occurs at a different stage from 
feature matching (e.g. comparison o f ‘north’ and position above). He found an 
interaction, and the interaction was superadditive. His conclusion was that the 
two processes occur in parallel but have to share a limited-capacity central 
processor.
These examples suffice to show some of the purely technical possibilities and 
difficulties attached to the verification method. The major issue in this review 
article should, of course, be the theoretical ‘stuffing’ of the different stages. We 
will return to this point in section 3.5. Here we will conclude by distinguishing 
three types of verification tasks. The main set of verification studies is concerned 
with sentence/picture comparisons. Coming back to our trademark metaphor, 
we see that this is certainly the trademark of Clark and his colleagues (see 13,44, 
45, 49, 50, 54, 56, 57, 58, 60, 148, 149). But it has also been widely used by others 
as well (65, 75, 98, 108, 160, 162, 204, 215, 247, 248, 256, 257) especially for the 
study of ambiguity (40, 89, 205). Table 1.2 (see section 3.5) summarizes most of 
these studies. (Word-verification studies are not mentioned.)
The second variety of verification studies has the subject test the truth or 
falsity of a sentence presented in isolation on the basis of his common knowledge 
of the world (e.g.‘Lions are more ferocious than sheep’—true or false?). Most 
studies in this category are basically interested in the organization of semantic 
memory and employ test sentences having the form of quantified statements 
(‘All canaries are birds’) (see 63, 106, 107, 134, 192, 213, 214). Other studies
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concern comparatives (43, 75) or variation of imagery value (147). Another set 
of studies is concerned with the relationship between clauses of a sentence; e.g. 
verifying the truth (151) or oddness (231) o f ‘i f . . . then’ statements. These latter 
studies are similar to the third variety of verification studies.
This last, and smallest, group of studies involves some sort of sentence/sen­
tence verification. A test sentence has to be verified on the basis of some earlier 
presented sentence. Here one can either vary the delay between the sentences (5, 
42) or present the two sentences simultaneously, as in Stillings’ (240) 
experiment. Since we have categorized the Banks et al. study (13) in the picture- 
verification group, even though it is essentially a question-answering task, we 
should also mention here some question-answering RT experiments using 
sentences as test material. These are mostly inference experiments (e.g. lA is 
better than B, B is better than C. Who is best?’; see 146, and also 52, 139), and are 
concerned with an imagery versus congruence explanation of the latency data. 
For a review of this Clark/Huttenlocher discussion, see Johnson-Laird (144). 
Amnon et al. (4) studied latencies for answering questions about self-embedded 
constructions and compared their results with probe-latency data. Garrod and 
Trabasso (105) studied latencies for answering questions about earlier presented 
text, very much as Anderson (5) has done.
2.2.6 Question answering
Question answering (QA) is the trademark of researchers in semantic memory. 
With respect to sentence comprehension we have already mentioned the QA 
latency studies in the framework of the preceding section. QA accuracy has been 
used in just a few studies. Among them are Blaubergs and Brain (27), who 
investigated self-embedding constructions as opposed to right-branching ones. 
Wright (271) measured QA accuracy as a function of syntactic correspondence 
between question and answer. Finally, three studies (Smith and McMahon, 234, 
Bever, 19, and Locatelli, 178) deal with the comprehension of sentences 
expressing two-event temporal orders. The paradigm is to ask the subject, 
‘Which event occurred first?’ Neither Smith and McMahon nor Locatelli found 
an effect of order of mention on QA reaction time. Bever relates this finding to 
data on 2-4 year-olds where order of mention does matter.
2.2.7 Miscellanea
Various other tasks have been given to subjects in order to study sentence 
comprehension. In comprehension latency tasks, subjects are requested to push 
a button as soon as they grasp the meaning of the sentence. Examples are 59, 
126, 159 and 207. Sometimes a subject is merely asked to make a compre- 
hensibilitv judgment (123, 133, 196, 228, 254, 255). Grammaticality, 
acceptability, or meaningfulness judgments were collected in various studies 
(55, 127, 197, 199). In choice tasks the subject is requested to choose between two
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meanings (175) or two implications (160) of a sentence. In some experiments 
subjects had to judge compatibility of sentences (35, 74, 111, 112), and various 
other more idiosyncratic techniques have also been used to study sentence 
comprehension.
2.2.8 Some conclusions
In the preceding sections some of the major experimental procedures used in 
studies of sentence comprehension have been reviewed. Among others, the 
following observations can be made:
(i) The research group is often a better predictor of a research method than is 
the theoretical problem.
(ii) Comparisons between methods, if made at all, are mostly inconclusive 
since apart from changing the dependent variable, one nearly always changes 
the independent variable as well.
(iii) If the research objective is merely to show the ‘psychological reality’ or 
‘validity’ of some linguistic notion, then most of the procedures we have 
mentioned can be appropriate.
(iv) If moreover, one wants to determine the stage at which a certain variable 
is effective, it is preferable to use either a simultaneous measurement procedure 
or a (successive) reaction-time method. The former is especially adequate if one 
is interested in the strictly perceptual stage, i.e. the processes operative during 
input of the sentence. The latter in principle allows for a Sternberg-type additive- 
factor method, but one has to make assumptions about nature, successiveness, 
and order of stages.
(v) Contrary to the original interpretation of phoneme-monitoring results in 
terms of the sharing of a limited capacity, detection and analysis of the target 
word seems to be a condition for phoneme detection. It is therefore necessary to 
control for all variables which might affect detection of the target word—which 
is rarely done.
(vi) Psychophysiological measurement during sentence perception is still an 
underutilized procedure.
(vii) Click localization can be affected by a great variety of factors, some of 
which clearly affect the very early stages of processing. It appears to be very 
troublesome, however, to vary just one of these factors, while keeping all others 
constant.
(viii) A major problem for recall tasks is to control for reconstructive 
activities which take place between the stimulus presentation and the response.
3. LINGUISTIC AND EX PER IM EN TA L VARIABLES
The experimental measurement procedures discussed in the former section have 
all been developed to study linguistic and other factors which could be expected 
to affect language perception. In many cases these independent variables had
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been derived from more encompassing theories, in other cases they seem to 
appear out of the blue, so to say, derived from interesting observations, well- 
known phenomena, and so forth. Whatever their origin, we will summarize the 
most important experimental variables that have figured in studies of sentence 
perception. In section 4, we will go deeper into the more general theoretical 
considerations which have been in the background of some of these studies.
3.1 Prosody and rhythm
Though the importance of suprasegmental features in the perception of 
sentences has never been seriously denied, variables such as pause structure, 
intonation contours, and speech rate have often been treated as nuisance 
variables which had to be controlled in order to study the effect of more 
important factors such as syntactic complexity and constituent structure. The 
result is that relatively little is known about the role of suprasegmental features 
in sentence perception, and especially little about how these features interact 
with other factors in the perceptual process.
Martin and his associates ( 189, 190, 233, 242) have done some basic work on 
the role of rhythm in sentence perception. They varied the structure of sentences 
by splicing tapes, inserting pauses or stretches of white noise at different places 
in naturally spoken sentences, or removing short stretches of speech. Their main 
measurement procedure has been phoneme-monitoring. They found a strong 
increase in reaction time when the rhythmic structure of the sentence was 
mutilated, even if the mutilation took place long before the target phoneme. 
Martin (190) concludes that ‘the main outlines of syntactical structure often are 
communicated relatively early in an utterance’, and ‘suprasegmental cues enable 
the listener to expect or anticipate rough outlines of speech not yet heard’. 
Dooling (72) confirmed this latter claim by showing that if a subject was set to 
recognize sentences (in noise) with a certain rhythmic pattern, he would tend to 
fail if a sentence with a different rhythmic pattern was suddenly presented.
Dooling counterbalanced syntactic changes that might also be involved and 
found that only the rhythmic changes were effective. In view of the above- 
mentioned ‘nuisance’ status of suprasegmental features, it is no surprise to find 
various studies in which such features are ‘traded against’ syntactic structure, as 
in Dooling’s article. As we have already noticed in section 2, some effort has 
gone into showing that suprasegmental features, and especially intonation, do 
affect phoneme-monitoring results (e.g. 67, 233), click localization (210), 
dichotic switch localization (266, 267), and bias in ambiguous sentences and 
phrases ( 173, 274). A similar effort was put into showing that these features were 
not the sole ones and that syntactic variables alone would also be effective (80, 
104, 241).
A more integrative approach would be to study exactly how the listener uses 
prosodic information to make early quesses about the clausal structure of the
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sentence. Here we should mention the pioneer work on intonation contours by 
Cohen and his associates at the Institute for Perception Research (61, 62, 124,
125, 154). They found that in order to render a syllable or word more prominent 
the speaker could use either a rise or a fall in intonation, or both. In the latter 
case, such a rise/fall has little predictive value. However, if only a rise is used, 
then at some place before the end of the sentence the intonation should go back 
to normal. The speaker has two options here: he could either go back to normal 
at another prominent word, using the fall as a marker there, or—and this is the 
critical issue—maintain his high intonation until the end of the clause and then 
begin the next clause at the normal level. This latter way of speaking does not 
lend prominence to the first word of the new clause. Thus, if a high intonation is 
maintained by the speaker after a rise, the listener can predict that either a 
second prominent word or a clause break will follow. The experiments show 
that listeners do have such expectations, and that they mostly expect clause 
breaks. Also the experiments by Darwin (69) mentioned earlier (sections 2.1.2 
and 2 .2 . 1) show that intonational cues are used to listen selectively and to delimit 
higher-order syntactic units. The question remains whether speakers normally 
provide sufficient prosodic information to enable the listener to use it 
predictively. Levelt et al. (175) found that disambiguating prosodic information 
is nearly absent if the ambiguous sentence is spoken in a disambiguating 
context. Here, clearly, the listener is supposed to be able to derive the correct 
reading of the sentence by using other sources of information.
Finally, variations in rate of presentation have also been studied, but almost 
exclusively in connection with visually presented sentences. High presentation 
rates have been used to study the effects of linguistic complexity under 
borderline conditions (84, 86, 129, 132, 163). Schwartz ei al. (228) found that 
under high-rate conditions subjects failed to understand sentences but were still 
able to judge reliably the comprehensibility of the verbal material. This is in
correspondence with Mistler-Lachman’s results on levels of processing (197, 
198, 199) which will be discussed in section 4.1.2. Miron and Brown (196) 
studied the effects on intelligibility of speeding up acoustic material. It was 
found that speech-pause times especially could be reduced without much effect 
on intelligibility.
3.2 Syntactic complexity
Studies of syntactic complexity originated from the aim to test the 
‘psychological reality’ of linguistic notions. As was discussed in section 1, this 
aim was twofold: to demonstrate the psychological validity of linguistic units 
and structures, and to show a one-to-one relationship between linguistic 
(transformational) rules and perceptual processes. The former goal was 
achieved more successfully than the latter. Characteristic of studies of the latter 
sort were efforts to vary the transformational complexity of sentences and to
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show that comprehensibility would covary. Although Fodor and Garrett (82) 
unmasked and disproved the ‘Derivational Theory of Complexity’ (DTC) 
underlying these studies, active/passive and affirmative/negative variables have 
continued to be used in studies of sentence perception, although usually not for 
the purpose of proving DTC.
3.2.1 Voice
Although there is a general tendency for passive sentences to be harder to 
comprehend than active sentences—in correspondence with DTC (see e.g.
177)—a closer look at the situations of use has shown that passives may lose this 
additional difficulty if they structurally match other aspects of the task 
situation. Olson and Filby (204) found that verifying a passive sentence with 
respect to a picture is easier if the picture evokes a ‘passive’ encoding—for 
example, if the largest or the focal object is the recipient of the action. A similar 
finding was reported by Flores d’Arcais (76) in an experiment where 
appropriateness of the descriptive sentence was judged by the subject. Wright 
(271) showed that answering questions about nouns in a sentence is relatively 
easy if the question corresponds in voice to the sentence. Green (112) found that 
voice correspondence between two sentences facilitated judgments of sameness 
and difference in meaning. Garrod and Trabasso (105) gave subjects short 
paragraphs of four sentences followed by a question about one of them. Apart 
from generally longer latencies for passive than for active questions, they found 
an interaction between voice of question and voice of sentence: if the two
correspond, latencies are shorter, at least for the first and the last short sentence 
in the paragraph. A similar correspondence effect is reported by Anderson and 
Bower (7), especially for the last sentence in a relatively long text. These experi­
ments were all inspired by the original study of Sachs (221), who showed that 
active test sentences at the end of a text are not recognized as passive (and vice 
versa), but that such confusions are the rule if the test sentence appeared earlier 
in the text.
The basic question, given these ubiquitous correspondence effects, concerns 
the availability of the surface and the underlying form of the sentence to the 
subject. On the one hand the correspondence effects can only be explained if the 
subject is able to work from a surface representation, while on the other hand 
there is evidence (see, for example, Clark, 54, Fodor et al., 80) that subjects can 
operate on the basis of underlying structure. One solution is to assume that 
subjects have the surface form, and therefore the voice of the sentence, available 
for a rather short period, but that they will lose it as soon as the sentence has 
been interpreted.
This assumption is compatible with the theory that the sentence clause is 
available verbatim in STM but that only its interpretation is transferred to
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LTM. For the voice experiments this theory is contradicted by the following 
evidence: (i) Wright’s (271) finding that the correspondence effect still occurs if 
the subject is forced to count backwards between test sentence and 
question—this activity presumably erasing STM content; (ii) Garrod and 
Trabasso’s (105) finding that not only the last sentence in their list of four, but 
also the first (which should have been overwritten in STM) shows the 
correspondence effect; and (iii) the finding of Sachs (221) and of Anderson and 
Bower (7) that some correspondence effect remains even if the test and the 
recognition or question sentence are far apart.
The other solution is that both surface and underlying form are available to 
the subject for a relatively long period, as already suggested in Garrod and 
Trabasso’s article. Further evidence is given by Anderson (5). This solution is 
compatible not only with the idea that the surface form is available both in STM 
and LTM (and Baddeley, 9, 10, gives convincing evidence that the recency effect 
can very well occur for information in LTM), but also with the more radical view 
that memory is not multi-store (see Craik and Lockhart, 66) but that perceptual 
(surface) and propositional (underlying) information have different rates of 
decay. This issue will be further discussed in section 4.1.2. That traces of such 
surface information can remain available in memory may be due to the 
communicative function of active versus passive sentences.
A final set of studies is concerned with the function of passives in discourse. 
Anisfeld and Klenbort (8, 160) showed that subjects preferred implications from 
passive sentences in which the logical subject is also the focal information point 
(comment). Passives are more markedly topic-creating in this respect than are 
actives. Grieve and Wales (115) and Hupet and Le Bouedec (138) show 
that voice can be confounded with definiteness of subject and object noun­
phrase, especially in full passives, and that definiteness had a topicalizing effect 
of its own. Hupet and Le Bouedec show that these variables are not independent 
in normal communicative usage: subjects clearly prefer the grammatical subject 
to be definite in both passive and active sentences, indicating that the passive 
voice is used if the logical object is presupposed, and that the logical subject 
carries the assertional information. Further evidence for this presupposition- 
creating function of passives can be found in Hornby’s (137) study. Presumably, 
listeners assume this functional interaction between surface form and presup­
position when they interpret passive forms.
0
3.2.2 Negation
‘What is so difficult about negation?’ is the title of one paper (Wales and Grieve, 
253). One answer is that negative sentences are transformationally more 
complex than affirmative ones and are therefore harder to understand. This 
answer, however, is a variant of DTC and clearly not satisfying. Wales and
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Grieve conjecture that a possibly important factor is ‘confusability’, i.e. the 
degree to which the negative statement’s interpretation resembles the affirma­
tive’s interpretation (e.g. ‘seven plus nine is not fifteen’ should be harder than 
‘seven plus nine is not seventy seven’). Though this factor seems to work, Greene 
and Wason (113) show convincingly that confusability does not interact with 
negation. The two factors are additive. One could say that they involve 
independent stages (in Sternberg’s sense) in the comprehension process. The 
stage-approach to negation has been popular in many of the verification studies 
(see section 2). In particular, many of the studies by Clark and his associates (45, 
57, 58, 149) use negation as one of the independent variables (see Table 1.2); and 
the classical finding is that true affirmative (TA) sentences are the easiest and 
true negatives (TN) are the hardest to verify. Somewhere in between are false 
affirmative (FA) and false negative (FN), usually in this order. The initial 
processing models developed for the explanation of these findings (see in 
particular Clark, 54, and Trabasso et al., 248) have in common an independent 
stage where the negative is recoded as a positive proposition. For instance, if the 
ball in the picture is either red or green, then the sentence‘The ball is not red’ gets 
internally represented as ‘GREEN (BALL)’. But at the same time, Clark (54) 
calls this model ‘cheating’, since normally there will be more than two alterna­
tives, thereby excluding the possibility of this easy transformation. The two- 
alternative case does occur naturally, however, in the case of marked versus 
unmarked adjectives. Negating an adjective may lead to recoding (see, e.g., 150), 
and the use of a marked adjective badly complicates the understanding of 
double-negative sentences (232). Not only marked adjectives but also connec­
tives such as or with a single alternative {and) behave as if they are psycholin- 
guistic negatives (see 237). Clark (54), as well as Trabasso (247), handles the 
multiple-alternative case by assuming that the negative is encoded as a positive 
proposition embedded in a negative (e.g., N eg(R ED  BALL)). Since the picture 
is assumed to be positively coded, the Neg-element must lead to a change in the 
truth value when comparing sentence and picture codes. This requires 
additional time. This model can therefore handle the longer latencies for 
negative sentences, since an (additional) change of truth value is required if the 
picture coding is assumed to be positive. Tanenhaus et al. (244) object to this 
solution, especially to Carpenter and Just’s (45) version of it, and we will return 
to the issue in section 3.5.
It should be noted that all these laboratory studies concern the cases TA, FA, 
FN, and TN, and that in such experiments negatives are usually harder to 
process than affirmatives. One might wonder whether these cases reflect the 
normal communicative uses of negation. Why, indeed, use negatives if they are 
harder to understand? Johnson-Laird (145) gave a first experimental example 
where negatives are in fact easier: One of the test sentences ‘John  is not rich’ or 
‘John is poor’ could follow the statement ‘Either John  is intelligent or he is rich’. 
The subjects found the negative test sentence easier to use when inferring that
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John is intelligent. Johnson-Laird made the point that negation has a natural 
function. Wason and Johnson-Laird (263) present a thorough review of 
experimental studies of negation—to which the reader is referred for further 
details—and they analyse what this natural function might be. They firstly cite 
Russell (220): ‘When I say truly “this is not blue” , there is on the subjective side, 
consideration of “this is blue” , followed by rejection, while on the objective side 
there is some colour, “different from blue” to suggest that the natural function of 
a negative is to deny a certain preconception’. This hypothesis was first tested 
and confirmed in two inventive studies by Greene (111, 112), who found, 
basically, that if a subject had to judge the agreement of meaning for a pair of 
sentences, one affirmative and the other negative, the task was easier if the 
sentences disagreed than if they agreed. The natural function of negation is to 
signal a change with respect to an existing belief or expectation. Wason and 
Johnson-Laird point out that contrary to most laboratory situations, in normal 
life listeners do not have to ‘transform’ negatives into affirmatives, since the 
affirmative is already there as a preconception—otherwise the negative would 
not have been used. Or to state it in the terms of the original laboratory 
experiments: negatives are normally used only as false negatives. The listener 
can be sure that the negative sentence is used to falsify an existing expectancy or 
belief. True negatives are unnatural laboratory constructions and they are 
harder because of their unnaturalness. This philosophy fits nicely in Clark and 
Haviland’s (59) ‘given/ new’ theory. One could say that the negative should only 
be used if the corresponding affirmative is given. Levelt and Noordman (174, 
202) add to this a so-called principle of minimal change: the given affirmative is 
not fully rejected; it is instead maximally maintained: only a single component 
(argument or predicate for sentences, semantic component for lexical items) is 
affected by negation. This is at least so for ‘normal’ communicative settings. 
Language does provide means, however, for more radical negation, namely by 
negating sentences containing positive polarity items (e.g. ‘John indeed didn’t 
answer the letter’). The borderline grammaticality of such constructions will 
lead to an ‘echo’ interpretation, that is, it will negate a verbatim repetition of 
what the former speaker said. In such a case the whole positive preconception 
may be dropped (cf. Baker, 12). This, however, has never been studied experi­
mentally. A thorough and comprehensive review of negation studies can be 
further found in Clark (54).
3.2.3 Relatives and complements
Section 2.2.4 described various studies which used paraphrasing and phoneme- 
monitoring tasks. Many of these studies used variations in relative clause and 
complement structure as dependent variables, and we refer to Table 1.1 for a 
summary of the major results. It was mentioned there that deleting the relative 
pronoun gave varying and in some cases conflicting results; it led to longer
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phoneme-moniyoring RTs in 119 and 120, but not in 92; it decreased 
paraphrasing accuracy in 82, 119, had no effect in 120, and increased accuracy in 
92; and it had no effect on paraphrasing reaction time (119). The major rationale 
for these studies of relative-pronoun deletion was the so-called deep-structure 
clue theory: the listener makes direct inferences from the surface properties of 
the sentence as to its underlying structural relations. The relative pronoun 
could, for instance, function in a decoding strategy (see section 4.1.1) that might 
run as follows: For the sequence NP-Rel-NP2, interpret the constituents NP, 
and NP2 as object and subject of the same verb. Deleting the Rel might interfere 
with the strategy. The strategy is not error-proof, as Foss and Lynch (92) have 
shown, and the empirical evidence for this instance of the deep-structure clue 
theory is dubious.
Another reason for experimenting with relative constructions is the old
question of why centre-embedded sentences are so difficult to understand. (The 
issue of self-embedding in psycholinguistics stems from Chomsky’s proof that 
English is not a regular language; see Levelt, 172, volume 2.) Nearly all studies 
show centre-embedded constructions to be harder to understand than corres­
ponding right-branching constructions, as long as the degree of embedding is 
two, or in some cases more than two (see Blaubergs and Brain, 27, with a recall 
task, Foss and Lynch, 92, with a phoneme-monitoring task, Freedle and Craun, 
97, and Hakes and Foss, 120, with paraphrasing accuracy, Hamilton and Deese, 
123, with comprehensibility rating, and various other studies). Note, however, 
that Hakes and Foss (120) did not find the predicted self-embedding effect in a 
phoneme-monitoring task and that Hakes et al. (121) criticized earlier studies 
because they had confounded self-embedding versus right-branching with 
object versus subject relatives. In a phoneme-monitoring experiment, and 
without this confounding, the author could not find a difference between self­
embedding and right-branching constructions. However, some effect of self­
embedding did occur for a paraphrase task. Blaubergs and Brain (27) were able 
to show that some learning did take place in the handling of self-embedding 
constructions, when subjects had been trained by performing tasks involving 
lesser degrees of embedding (but not inversely). Baird and Koslick (11) showed 
that verb-object relations were better recalled if the relative clause was of the 
subject-focus type (The boy who kicked the ball chased the girl’) than if it was of 
the object-focus type (The  boy whom the girl chased ran home’). Moreover, 
subject-verb relations were equally well recalled in nested and non-nested 
constructions, thus casting doubt on an interruption theory of self-embedding 
complexity.
Finally, we should mention three experiments with complements. Forster(84) 
showed that, with the exception of a few complement constructions, two-clause 
sentences were generally more complex than one-clause sentences (method: 
rapid serial visual presentation). Holmes and Forster (132) were able to extend 
this finding to include that- and fo r  /o-complements. They conclude that
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sentence complexity is not related simply to the number of clauses. Hakes (118) 
found an effect of //7tf/-deletion in /^ /-com plem ent constructions, namely that 
in phoneme-monitoring RTs were longer in the deleted constructions. The effect 
of deletion on paraphrasing accuracy, however, was dubious.
3.2.4 Verb structure
The deep-structure clue theory also assigned a major role to the main verb of the 
sentence. Verbs have characteristic underlying structures in which they can 
occur, so that direct structural inference should be possible on the basis of the 
verb-token in the sentence. Such inference should be relatively difficult to make 
if the verb has several underlying structures into which it would fit. Fodor^/ al. 
(83) tested this prediction for ‘complex’ verbs such as know , which can take 
either a /^ /-com plem ent or an object-NP, as compared with 'simple’ transitive 
verbs such as meet, which do not allow for a /^¿//-complement. The results were 
partly positive: paraphrasing accuracy and anagram solution accuracy were 
higher for simple verbs than for complex verbs. However, this variable affected 
neither paraphrasing RT nor anagram solution RT. Hakes (117) confirmed the 
paraphrasing accuracy result, but failed to find an effect on phoneme- 
monitoring. Holmes and Forster (132) used their rapid visual presentation 
method and showed that sentences with simple verbs were recalled better than 
sentences with complex verbs. These different results can be explained if the 
effect of verb complexity is merely reconstructive; that is, the creation of a 
complex verb sentence (in the paraphrasing recall and anagram tasks) may be 
harder, but this does not necessarily imply additional perceptual complexity. 
Levelt et al. (174) showed that sentences containing either simple or complex 
verbs of motion (like move  vs rise) could be verified more quickly for complex 
verbs than for simple verbs, in perceptual situations where both sentences were 
true. In such situations, for example where one observes a quickly rising dot, the 
complex verb is more appropriate, in accordance with Grice’s (114) maxim of 
quantity. A very different approach to verb structure is exemplified by Stillings 
(240). The subject was typically presented with a sentence such as ‘Mary just 
loaned a book to John ’, and then had to verify the further sentence ‘John didn’t 
have the book’. The verification model predicting the reaction time is based on a 
system of meaning rules, which are written as programs for converting one 
sentence into the other. Stillings compared borrow  and loan in various verifica­
tion tasks and was able to substantiate his model.
3.3. Ambiguity
The effects of ambiguity on the comprehension of sentences have been studied 
intensively since the papers of MacKay and Bever appeared (180, 183). Initially 
a fruitful distinction was made between lexical, surface, and deep-structure
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ambiguities. The first type involves ambiguous lexical items, as with ‘the soldier 
put the gasoline into the tank’; the second involves word-grouping ambiguities 
as in: ‘the three masted British ships were sailing south’, and the last involves 
underlying relations without surface-grouping effects: ‘Italians like opera as 
much as Germans’. Only the first and last variety are genuine homophones. 
Surface ambiguities are at best homographs; they should be, and in fact are, per­
ceptually non-homophonic with explicit pronounciation (175). Experimental 
results with lexical ambiguities have sometimes been rather different from those 
with underlying ambiguities. Since there are theoretical reasons why they should 
be different (see 22 , 91 ), and since almost all studies are on lexical ambiguity, we 
will begin with a review of lexical ambiguity and conclude this section with a few 
remarks on deep-structure ambiguities.
3.3.1 Lexical ambiguity
The main issues in the study of lexical ambiguity have been the following: 
(i) Does lexical ambiguity complicate the processing of a sentence? (ii) Are both 
meanings of the lexical item computed during sentence perception, or only one?
(iii) How does context affect ambiguity resolution? (iv) When is ambiguity 
resolved: immediately or with a short or long delay? These questions are not 
independent; moreover, each of them needs further qualification. Let us 
consider them in turn.
(i) Does lexical ambiguity complicate sentence processing? The following 
studies have compared sentence processing with and without lexical ambiguity:
22 ,35 ,37 ,64 ,88 ,89 ,91 ,  101, 128, 180, 183, 197, 206,230. These studies involved
a large variety of tasks, and in almost all cases an effect of ambiguity was found. 
In particular, one finds longer reaction times in the ambiguous case if the subject 
has to judge compatibility between the test sentence and a second sentence (35) 
or a probe word (230), or even if one has to judge the colour of the visually 
presented probe word (64). Longer RTs are also found for phoneme-monitoring 
if the test phoneme shortly follows the ambiguous word (37, 88, 91). Verifying 
the truth of a sentence (205), deciding on the ambiguity of the last word of a 
sentence (128), and verifying the sentence vis-à-vis a picture (89), all lead to 
longer reaction times in the ambiguous case. Furthermore, clicks are less 
accurately localized (101) in lexically ambiguous sentences. On the basis of a 
depth of processing argument (see section 4.1.2), Mistler-Lachman (197) 
predicted and found no effect of lexical ambiguity on RT in a meaningfulness 
judgment task.
The only tasks for which the results are conflicting are completion tasks. If the 
subject is asked to add an appropriate continuation sentence to the test sentence 
one finds either no effect of lexical ambiguity on RTs (22), or an effect with 
unspecified statistical significance ( 197), which, moreover, seems to appear if the
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test sentence is preceded by a disambiguating context sentence. Also, if the 
subject has to complete an ambiguous sentence fragment, then the effect of 
lexical ambiguity is unclear when the fragment is an incomplete clause. MacKay 
(180) found 0.5 sec longer completion times (measured by stopwatch) for 
lexically ambiguous fragments; the effect is of unspecified significance. Olson 
and MacKay (206) found a significant effect on completion RT, but Bever et al. 
(22) and Cairns and Kamerman (37) did not. These differences, however, may be 
more apparent than real: in the latter two studies, (insignificant) differences in 
RT of 240 and 200 msec were found respectively, whereas Olson and MacKay 
found a (significant) RT-effect of 200 msec, which is of the same order of 
magnitude. It should be added, moreover, that the statistics used in all of these 
studies are subject to Clark’s (53) critique. At any rate, production tasks are not 
very sensitive to lexical ambiguity. All other tasks, however, showed the 
predicted effects of ambiguity, so that it makes sense to pose the next question:
(ii) Are both meanings o f  the lexical item computed during sentence 
perception, or only one? The additional effort of computing both meanings may 
explain several of the foregoing results. However, the question (which is asked in 
several of the reviewed papers) is highly confusing if it is not further qualified. 
What does it mean to ‘compute’ both meanings of a lexical item? It is certainly 
insufficient to state that ‘both readings are in some sense available’ to the listener 
(164), or that ‘both meanings are activated in memory’ (64). One might use 
Morton’s (200) logogen-model to distinguish two senses of ‘available’. If a 
homophone activates both logogens in LTM, they both become more available 
since both have an increased probability of reaching activation-threshold. If, 
moreover, both logogens do reach threshold they both fire (simultaneously, or 
in quick succession), thereby delivering the responses to working memory. This 
is a second and stronger sense of availability: the subject is conscious of both 
meanings. Foss and Jenkins (91) explicitly proposed this latter strong sense of 
availability. In the literature strong availability is often determined by asking the 
subject whether he noticed the ambiguity. If one trusts this test, as Foss and 
Jenkins apparently do, and if in the majority of cases the subjects turn out not to 
have noticed the ambiguity (a very general finding), it is in my view contradic­
tory to maintain the strong version of double availability. In my opinion the test 
is not fully satisfying, and we are therefore left with three possibilities.
(a) During a lexically ambiguous sentence the homophone initially activates 
one logogen only. At a certain moment it fires, and that particular meaning is in 
working memory for structural integration.
(b) The homophone activates both logogens until one fires: one meaning 
becomes conscious, the other logogen gradually turns back to rest state. We call 
this the weak theory o f  double availability.
(c) The homophone activates both logogens up to threshold level: both 
meanings become conscious. This is the strong theory o f  double availability.
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Alternative (a) should be dismissed. It contradicts substantial experimental 
evidence (see Morton, 200), and it is unclear how the homophone would ‘know’ 
which logogen to activate. However, there are naive versions of the so-called one- 
meaning or unitary perception theories that come close to (a). Both (a) and (b) 
are one-meaning theories in the sense that only one meaning of the word 
becomes available to working memory. Originally, many authors did not 
consider the possibility of activating a meaning without making it conscious. In 
Lashley’s (167) garden-path paper, but also in Foss (88), Carey et al. (40), Cairns 
(35), and Hogaboam and Perfetti (128), we find the theory that only the most 
likely meaning of an ambiguous word becomes conscious and that as long as the 
most likely meaning is also the correct meaning (given the context and the task) 
there is no difference whatsoever from the unambiguous case. Problems only 
arise if the secondary meaning is intended. The subject should then retrace the 
blind alley and find the other meaning, this leading to longer reaction times. 
There is evidence, however, that even though only one meaning becomes 
conscious, the secondary meaning gets activated during comprehension; this is 
exactly the difference between models (a) and (b). The evidence mainly derives 
from the dichotic studies of Lackner and Garrett (164) and the extensive replica­
tion thereof by MacKay (183). Basically, these authors found that one can bias 
the interpretation of a lexically ambiguous sentence, presented to one ear, by 
simultaneously presenting a word to the other ear, which is related to one or the 
other reading of the ambiguous word. The stimulus conditions are such that the 
subjects are unable to reproduce the biasing word. If only the dominant meaning 
were retrieved in the way of model (a), it would be impossible to bias one way or 
Xhe other (see 164). It seems necessary to allow for the possibility that both 
logogens become activated, as in model (b). In that case the biasing word might 
add to the activation of the corresponding logogen, increasing the chance that it 
will fire first. The other bit of evidence against model (a) is Olson and MacKay’s 
(206) result that the completion of an ambiguous sentence fragment takes longer 
than the completion of a non-ambiguous control sentence. If the subject 
completes according to the first meaning which comes to mind, there will be no 
retracing, and model (a) would not predict the RT difference. Would model (b)?
To answer this question, one has to look into the relevant results in more 
detail. The authors find an effect of lexical ambiguity on completion RT only for 
those cases where the two possible interpretations are about equally likely (bias 
range of 40-60%). They propose the so-called perceptual suppression theory: 
the two sets of features (logogens in Morton’s terminology) are supposed to 
interact: in order to activate one logogen to reach threshold level, the other one 
has to be de-activated. It is not hard to suppress the recessive logogen activity in 
the case of a 90/10 bias; the reaction time will not be noticeably different from 
the unambiguous case. Suppression, however, is difficult in a 50/50 bias situa­
tion since both logogens have a high level of activation. It should be remarked 
that in Morton’s model logogens are independent; and one should ask whether
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that simple principle should be abandoned in the light of these data. Not yet, I 
believe. In the same way as it is agreed that it takes relatively much effort to 
suppress a likely meaning (as in the 50/50 case), one could state that it takes 
relatively much effort to activate the other logogen up to threshold. This might 
be very easy for the dominant meaning in the 90/10 case—one does not need a 
suppression model here. Olson and MacKay give two further arguments for 
their suppression theory^buT these concern the case where one meaning is 
already conscious. Suppression here means erasure from working memory. This 
has nothing to do with interaction between logogens. And finally, all other 
existing evidence for logogen interaction with homographs points to facilitation 
instead of inhibition, i.e. in order to activate one logogen, the activation of a 
related one may be helpful. This is the homograph effect reported by Rubenstein 
and his associates (218, 219), and Schvaneveldt and Meyer (227). (Whether this 
effect is due to logogen-interaction, however, is doubtful, in view of the long 
reaction times in these experiments.) So far model (b), the weak theory of double 
availability without subthreshold suppression, seems to suffice. What about 
model (c), the strong theory of double availability? It seems to me that it is in 
general not necessary to suppose that both interpretations are simultaneously 
present in working memory. Except for the relatively infrequent cases where 
subjects notice the ambiguity, there are no compelling data in the literature 
suggesting that the strong model (c) should be adopted. There is substantial 
confusion here about the requirements of the weak and the strong theory, 
especially with respect to the role of context. Let us, therefore, turn to the next 
question.
(Hi) How does context affect ambiguity resolution? We have already 
mentioned the findings by Lackner and Garrett (164) and MacKay (182) in 
which biasing information in one ear affects the interpretation of the material 
presented to the other ear. Normally, disambiguating context either precedes or 
follows the ambiguous item; some authors have studied the role of such context 
in the comprehension of ambiguous sentences. Foss and Jenkins (91) distinguish 
two ways in which prior context can influence the interpretation of an 
ambiguous word in a sentence. In the so-called Prior Decision Model, the prior 
context activates (to use Morton’s terms) all related logogens: the logogen corres­
ponding to the contextually appropriate reading of the ambiguous word thus 
gets an activation advantage before the word itself has appeared. This is the 
weak model (b) above. According to the Choice Point Decision Model both 
interpretations of the ambiguous word are activated and transferred to working 
memory: context asserts its effect only later, i.e. it helps to select from among 
items already present in working memory. This is clearly the strong model (c), 
which predicts an effect on working memory-load regardless of whether 
disambiguating context has been presented. With a phoneme-monitoring task, 
Foss and Jenkins found strong evidence for the latter model: biasing prior
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context does not affect monitoring RTs, whereas ambiguity itself quite clearly 
does so. This supports the strong model. Quite similar results were obtained by 
Conrad (64), who also found that biasing prior context had little or no effect on 
her colour-naming task: after the (to be remembered) sentence had been 
presented, the subject was visually presented with the ambiguous target word (a 
category name, which was either appropriate or inappropriate to the correct 
interpretation of the ambiguous word) or a control word. The subject had to 
name the colour of the printed word. RTs were longer for ambiguous words and 
their category names than for control words. But again, the effect of biasing 
context was negligible. Conrad concludes that apparently an independent stage 
of lexical search exists. But though this finding fully agrees with the results of 
Foss and Jenkins, Conrad favours ka theory in which contextual information 
increases the strength of one or more of the activated meanings of a word to the 
point that it reaches threshold and becomes conscious’. This, however, is the 
weak model (b)!—so essentially the same results are interpreted as confirming 
the strong theory in one case and the weak theory in another. Putting this 
confusion aside, there are at least four reasons for not adopting the strong 
theory: Firstly, Foss and Jenkins found that most subjects had been unaware of 
the ambiguity, and that both the aware and the unaware subjects gave essentially 
the same results with respect to the critical variables. This is unlikely to have 
happened if the two interpretations had been in working memory, i.e. conscious 
(see above). Secondly, Foss and Jenkins correctly state that an effect of context 
might be critically time-bound, i.e. a disambiguating context appearing either 
too early or too late might not be effective at the moment of entrance of the 
ambiguous word. This may also be the case for Conrad’s results, who is 
measuring a fairly long time after the lexical search process (the visually 
presented test word follows the acoustically presented sentence), and is therefore 
using a successive measurement technique (see section 2 .2) that does not allow 
direct inferences as to the precise moment of the lexical search. Thus, further 
measurement might show a context effect, such as found by Morton and Long 
(201) in a phoneme-monitoring task with non-ambiguous material. Thirdly, 
there are the general problems with the phoneme-monitoring technique, 
discussed in section 2.2.1. Finally, as Hogaboam and Perfetti (128) state, one 
should consider these experimental results from the point of view of the primary 
and secondary meanings of the ambiguous word. Even if a word has a 50/50 
bias, an individual subject will (given the weak theory) allow one (his primary) 
interpretation to occupy working memory. Measurable effects may occur in just 
those cases where this (primary) interpretation conflicts with the context which 
requires the secondary meaning. Summing over subjects will then show an 
overall effect of ambiguity but no context effect, as found by Foss and Jenkins 
and by Conrad. Although this fully fits the weak theory (b), it should be noted 
that the effect of context is supposed to take place in working memory, and not 
directly through activation oflogogens. Hogaboam and Perfetti’s experiment is
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itself, however, somewhat inconclusive, since asking the subject whether the last 
word of a sentence was ambiguous is highly unnatural, just as in Olson and 
Mackay’s (206) study, where he subject is asked to find a second meaning after 
one has already been given. Such conscious search is not typical for sentences 
containing ambiguous items.
(iv) When is lexical ambiguity resolved? If the weak theory of double avail­
ability (b) is correct, the effect of lexical ambiguity should come to an end as 
soon as the one meaning is transferred to working memory. Only in cases where 
later context requires the alternative meaning will reprocessing become 
necessary; this is the well-known garden-path effect. In all other cases, however, 
one would expect the effect of lexical ambiguity to be very shortlived. Note that 
in the alternative strong theory (c), where both interpretations are available in 
working memory, longer lasting effects could be expected since rejection of one 
of the two meanings will depend either on later disambiguating information or 
on the arrival of the end of the clause (as Bever^/ al. (22) propose). The available 
evidence is limited but in agreement with the weak theory; there is not the 
slightest evidence for long-lasting effects of lexical ambiguity (apart from 
garden-path effects). In order to test the duration of the ambiguity effect one can 
only use simultaneous measurements (see section 2.1). The Bever et al. (22) 
sentence-completion task (on visually presented materials) is a successive 
measurement; moreover, in spite of their theory, lexical ambiguity had no effect 
on completion latencies. The only simultaneous measurement experiments are 
those of Foss et al. (88, 91) and of Cairns and Kamerman (37), who used the 
phoneme-monitoring technique (with all its disadvantages; see section 2 . 1. 1). 
Foss (88) found a significant 40 msec effect of ambiguity on monitoring latency. 
However, this was a mixture of lexical and underlying ambiguities. How large 
the non-significant differences between the two types was is not stated in the 
paper. Also, the target phoneme was given at different delays after the 
ambiguous element, but this was not a systematic variable. Foss and Jenkins 
(91) found a significant effect of lexical ambiguity of 38 msec. The target delay 
never exceeded two words in this experiment, and it was mostly shorter. The 
only experiment where target delay was systematically varied was conducted by 
Cairns and Kamerman (37). At zero delay, where the target phoneme 
immediately followed the ambiguous lexical item, a significant 20 msec delay 
was found, but at a two-word delay the ambiguity effect disappeared. The 
authors conclude that lexical decisions are taken immediately before, and not 
after, transfer to working memory. In summary, although lexical ambiguity can 
clearly complicate sentence comprehension, there is little evidence that working 
memory is involved in this additional load (except for garden-path phenomena 
or any other task where later recomputation is required for the subject). Rather, 
a weak theory of double availability can explain all available data: the 
ambiguous element—as well as earlier context—can activate both logogens, but
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normally only one reaches threshold, so that one interpretation becomes 
available to working memory; this happens very rapidly after the appearance of 
the lexical item. This interpretation is in good agreement with the general notion 
that semantic and syntactic processing is very much ‘on-line’ activity, (see 
section 4.1.1, and especially the work of Marslen-Wilson).
3.3.2 Deep-structure ambiguities
Deep or underlying-structure ambiguities have been the subject of various 
experimental studies (see 22, 28, 39, 49, 88, 89, 164, 180, 181, 182, 183, 197,262). 
Here we will limit ourselves to a few remarks about the question of whether in 
comprehension tasks underlying ambiguities behave differently from lexical 
ambiguities. Evidence shows that in most experiments this is not so. Apart from 
cases where subjects are led up a garden path, i.e. spontaneously produce one 
interpretation when another interpretation is required (see for instance 89), or 
cases where subjects are asked to find the other meaning (as in 183), underlying 
ambiguities are not more difficult to handle than lexical ambiguities (see 88, 164, 
197).
There is, however, some evidence that underlying ambiguities can be distin­
guished from lexical ambiguities in critical tasks. Bever et al. (22) found that 
sentence completion may be relatively quick if an underlying ambiguous clause 
(in contrast to a non-ambiguous clause) is presented to the subject. This is not 
the case for lexical ambiguities. If the presented clause is incomplete, however, 
deep ambiguity tends to slow down completion. Again, this is not so in the case 
of lexical ambiguities. This different behaviour is explained by Bever et al. by 
assuming that the hearer ‘is carrying out two distinct perceptual operations 
during presentation of a sentence fragment with an underlying structure 
ambiguity’. If completion is required before the end of the clause, the subject 
must choose between two incomplete and independent interpretations. In 
lexical ambiguity there is less independence, which supposedly makes the choice 
easier and less forced. If completion is required at the end of a clause, the fact 
that there are two independent interpretations available increases the chance of 
finding (at least) one completion. Apart from a need for confirmation of these 
results (the effects are around borderline significance and no Min F'-test (see 
Clark, 53) has been used), there is a need for clarification o f ‘carrying out two 
distinct perceptual operations’. This would require parallel processing in 
working memory, and one would like to see a more explicit model of the 
operations involved. The best available model here is Wanner’s (259, 262). 
Based on an ATN analysis of relative-clause parsing (see section 4.3.2), Wanner 
and Shiner (262) predict a preference for a direct object interpretation of 
ambiguous sentences of the sort ‘The patient that the nurse brought the doctor, 
hated rainy days’. In an experiment with control of semantic bias, strong 
evidence was obtained for this prediction. At the heart of the Wanner model is a
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mechanism where syntactic function assignment is postponed until the relevant 
information arrives. Therefore, contrary to the Bever et al. notion, Wanner and 
Shiner suppose that neither are both interpretations computed nor a single one: 
rather none is computed; the decision is postponed, and since postponement 
requires the storage of information, it is a load-increasing process.
3.4. Constituent and clause structure
In this section we will limit ourselves to presenting some of the major opinions 
about perceptual units of segmentation to be found in the literature. Since many 
of the studies on segmentation employed the click-localization technique, we 
should keep in mind the methodological difficulties proceeding from this 
technique (see section 2.2.1). Also, the recall techniques (see section 2.2.2) that 
seem to support the psychological reality of clause structure do not necessarily 
show that this reality is perceptual. Relatively little simultaneous measurement 
has been used for segmentation units (see, however, 3, 24, 77, 186). In the search 
for the psychological reality of linguistically defined segments, major consti­
tuents were among the first candidates of investigation. Fodor and Bever (79) 
claimed perceptual reality of major constituents on the basis of click-location 
results. Bever, Lackner, and Kirk (25) modified this view in the sense that 
only those constituent boundaries which related to deep-structure sentoid 
boundaries were able to attract clicks. Opposition to this position came from 
Chapin et al. (48) and Toppino (246), who tried to show that surface boundaries 
not relating to sentoids could attract clicks. Fodor etjal. (80) challenged Chapin 
et al.'s critique on the basis of an analysis of the linguistic material which they 
had used for their experiment. After a review of the major literature on clause 
structure, Fodor et al. (80) conclude that ‘surface constituent boundaries which 
correspond to junctures between sentoids define the potential points of 
perceptual segmentation of sentences; whether any such point is in fact taken as 
the boundary of a perceptual unit may depend on a variety of other structural
features’ (p. 339)—a rather cautious statement. An important addition to the 
search for reality of linguistic segments was an effort to determine the functional 
role of such segments in the perceptual event. Fodor et al. (80) propose the 
theory that ‘As the sentence is received, it is assigned to a short-term store where 
the fragments that constitute each of its sentoids are collected together. Material 
is dismissed from this storage as soon as it can be asigned to a completed sentoid. 
It is because each sentoid is dismissed from this siore en bloc that the clause 
functions as a unit of speech perception) (p. 342-343). Thus, at the end of the 
clause the materials are assembled and assigned relations according to the 
sentoid structure. There have been reactions against both the sentoid inter­
pretation of segmentation units and the clause-by-clause processing theory. In 
spite of the fact that Fodor et al?s most recent statement about segmentation
38 Studies in the Perception o f  Language
units was quite modest, Tanenhaus and Carroll (243) attacked the position that 
the segmentation unit could be structurally defined; in its place they propose the 
notion of ‘functional clause’, which expresses, among other things, so-called 
‘functional completeness’: A clause can be a candidate for a segmentation unit 
only if it expresses a complete set of grammatical relations (as, for example, in 
‘After Mary finished the cake, she took an apple’, and not in ‘After finishing, 
Mary took an apple’). It was mainly Marslen-Wilson (184, 185, 186, 187, 188) 
who attacked what he called the ‘staggered serial model’, i.e., the notion that 
syntactic analysis would only take place after a whole syntactic unit, such as a 
phrase or clause, had been gathered. His shadowing and word-monitoring 
experiments clearly show that syntactic analysis takes place right from the 
beginning of the clause, inter-actively with phonetic and semantic analysis. A 
more formal model of such on-line processing has been proposed by Wanner?/ 
al. (259, 260).
What is lacking at the present moment is a restatement of the relationship 
between segmentation units and working memory. If clausal ‘reality’ is not in 
fact caused by end-of-clause interpretation plus release from working memory, 
are we then bound to dismiss clausal reality after all, or should we seek its cause 
among other memorial functions? The contributions of Marslen-Wilson et al. 
and Carroll et al. to the present volume shed a wholly new light on this issue.
3.5. Pictoral context
Many studies in sentence perception have used pictoral variables in order to 
study how sentence comprehension interacts with non-linguistic perceptual 
context. Almost all of these studies were of the verification type (see section 
2.2.5). Table 1.2 gives a summary of the linguistic and pictoral variables used in 
these sentence-verification studies, as well as of the major results obtained.
What are the major principles which govern most of these results? All 
theoretical accounts (45, 54, 56, 58) are based on the assumption that the 
sentence is internally represented in abstract propositional format. The same is 
assumed about the internal representation of the picture. Verification proceeds 
through a serial process of comparison between these two internal represen­
tations, with the order of comparison being determined by the propositional 
hierarchy. Reaction times are determined by the number of operations to be 
performed in the serial comparison. The number of operations critically 
depends on the number of mismatches between the two propositional represen­
tations: this is known as the congruence principle (Clark, 54).
In general, the serial nature of sentence/picture verification processes finds 
substantial support in the literature; see, however, our earlier remarks in section
2.2.5. Though the congruence principle seems to find similarly strong support, it 
should be noted that this support depends on (a) the representation one chooses 
for sentence and picture and (b) the order of comparison one assumes. With
Table 1.2 Sentence-picture verification experiments
Authors Linguistic variables
Banks, Clark and Lucy (1975) 1 Which balloon/yo-yo is
higher/lower? Which 
string is longer/shorter?
2 Same
Cary, Mehler and Bever (1970) 1 Set-list of four Adjectival
(A) ( they are incoming 
signals) or Progressive (P) 
( they are unearthing 
diamonds) sentences, 
followed by ambiguous 
test sentence (they are 
lecturing doctors) Ear of 
entry
2 Same
Carpenter and Just (1972)
Carpenter and Just (1974)
Type of quantifier: 
m inority /m ajority ,  few/ 
many (of the dots are 
red/black)
1 Negation and colour 
name: It is (n ’t)  true that 
the dots are (n ’t) 
red/green
2 Same
Pictoral variables Order Main results
A I_1 or B and 
varying string difference
A 1 I or B • i  constant 
string-length (1 cm)
S ^ P
S ^ P
Balloon/yo-yo x A/B 
interaction (congruency) 
No congruency x length 
difference effect
Congruency effect. No 
congruency x height 
diff. effect
Pictures for which bo th  P -> S 
in terpretations are true 
(TT) only one (TF or FT) 
or bo th  false (FF)
For ambiguous sentences 
A/P x ear of entry inter­
action for reaction times. 
In terpretation bias 
according to set. No 
true/false effect
Same P S No interpretation bias
A 2 black, 14 red dots 
B 2 red, 14 black dots
16 dots of 1 colour: red, 
green or black
S ^ P
Simulta­
neous
Interaction between 
quantifier and locus of 
fixation (i.e. red or 
black subset)
No negation x colour con 
gruence interaction. RT 
increases with number of 
constituent comparisons
Same
Table 1.2 (continued)
Authors Linguistic variables
Clark, Carpenter and Just
(1973)
1 Which is taller/shorter 
Which is deeper/shallower
2 Same
3 Same
4 Dimensionality of com ­
parative: which is taller/ 
shorter/bigger/smaller? 
which is wider/narrower/ 
bigger/smaller?
5 Same
Clark and Chase (1972) 1 Star (plus) is (n ’t) above 
(below) plus (star)
2 Same
Pictoral variables Order Main results
□  □ neous
P
Simulta- RT (tall/short) <  RT
(deep/shallow). RT (tall, 
deep) <  RT (short, 
shallow). No interaction 
simultaneous/S -► P with 
any variable
A _ B
EL
s->p
Five boxes ‘looked in to ’ 
from different angles
S - * P
Two rectangles, one being S 
a square differing only in 
width. Two rectangles, one 
being a square, differing 
only in height
P
Same, but no square 
rectangles
RT (tall/short) <  RT 
(deep/shallow). Inter­
action A/B x (tall, short)/  
(deep, shallow)
Interaction box-type x (tall, 
short)/(deep, shallow)
Two-dimensional terms 
quicker, one-dimensional 
terms slower for square
Two pictures: star above 
or below plus
S P One-dimensional terms
quicker, two-dimensional 
terms slower for the more 
rectangular figure
Simulta- RT (above) <  RT (below) 
neous Aff <  Neg True <  False. No
interactions
Same S P Same, plus interaction 
P S pos/neg x true/false
S P quicker than P -* S
3 Same
Clark and Chase (1974)
>
Clark and Lucy (1975)
Cormish (1971)
Flores d ’Arcáis (1974)
1 Dependent linguistic 
variable (spontaneous 
descriptions)
2 Star (line) is ( n ’t) above 
(below) line (star), or 
star (circle) is (n ’t)  above 
(below) circle (star)
Ten different types of 
request to either or not 
( ‘polarity’) colour circle 
blue or pink
The circle is not all blue 
(red, green, yellow)
1 Comparatives with 
‘m arked ’ vs ‘unm arked’ 
adjectives (tall vs short , 
etc.). Orally presented
2 Comparatives with 
marked vs unmarked 
adjectives. Orally 
presented
Same, instructions to P -+ S 
a ttend b o t to m /to p  of 
figure, or whole figure
Relative prominence of P -»• S 
objects, i.e. star above 
(below) line (prominent) 
or circle (non-prominent)
Same
Blue or pink circle S P
Circle with different S -> P 
differently large sectors 
of red (etc.)
Pictures with two S P
persons, animals, etc. 
differing on the 
a n to n y m ’s dimension
Two long test lines 
among small ones, or two 
short test lines among 
long ones. Test lines diff­
ered in size. Similarly for
RT (whole) <  RT (b o t to m /  
top). No interactions
Preference for above. 
Above-bias for non-pro­
minent picture independent 
of orientation; for the pro­
minent picture dependent 
on orientation
No above/below x star/posi­
tion interaction
Truth  x polarity inter­
action
Non-monotonic sector size 
effect on verification RT
Longer RT for marked 
than for unmarked. True 
quicker than false
Longer RT for marked 
than for unmarked. True 
quicker than false.
No effect of size of test 
lines (etc.)
S-^P
S -> P
f
Table 1.2 (continued)
Authors Linguistic variables
3 Same as 2
4 Marked or unmarked cue- 
adjective presented before 
picture. Sentences with 
larger vs smaller, or less 
large vs less small
Foss, Bever and Silver (1968) Ambiguous or non-
ambiguous sentences
Glucksberg, Trabasso and Wald
(1973) I
 Car 1 i hit 1 i fence 1 
truck  I I passed > | pole \
bus I I pulled JI tree J 
train J I
In either active or passive 
(A/P) form. Thus, some 
reversible, some irre­
versible (R /I)Hornby (1974) 1 Cleft/pseudo-cleft 
sentences
Pictoral variables Order Main results
positions of weighing bal­
ance, more or less filled 
glasses, smaller or 
larger blocks
Same as 2
Same as 1, plus cue-adjec­
tive x sentence adjective 
interaction
Same as 2 P ->• S
Large and small circle P -> S
Pictures for which 
sentence is either true or 
false
S - » P
Corresponding pictures P - * S
S -> P
Longer RTs for ambiguous 
sentence only if picture 
presents unexpected mean­
ing
For true sentences:
A/P x R/I interaction for 
S -* P only.
For false sentences:
A/P interaction with locus 
of mismatch
Picture true, or picture 
false with respect to 
resp. focus or proposition
S-* P More errors for false/pre- 
supposed than for false/ 
focused
Just and Carpenter 
(1971)
Krueger (1972)
Olson and Filby (1972)
2 S tandard /c left /pseudo­
cleft sentences (S/C/P) 
Sentence voice (A/P)
Same
1 Three types of negatives: 4 x 4  array of dots. All 
syn-not (not,  none, no) 16 same colour or two 
syn (few, scarcely, hardly) with different colour 
sem (a minority , a small 
proposition etc.)
2 Same
3 Two types of negatives: 
syn and sem
Same
Same, but instruction to 
code colour of larger or 
smaller subset
S P More errors for false/pre­
supposed.
A/P-effect (for errors) 
S/C/P-effect
Simulta- RT (Neg) >  RT ( Aff)
Aff/Neg x True/false inter­
action for syn-not and syn 
Type of neg x Aff/Neg x 
True/False interaction
neous
(sen­
tence
left)
P ^  S
P ^ S
Aff/Neg x T /F  interaction 
only for syn-not
For ‘code larger subset’ 
same interactions as in 
expt. 1 ; for syn and sem. 
For ‘code smaller sub­
set’ inverse interaction
1—4 Is (n ’t)
1
north
east
south
west
T h e ' car , ! hit the j truck 
I truck  I 'car
Active/Passive
2 Same
Circle above, below, left Simulta- Interaction Neg/Aff x 
of, right of sentence neous location of circle
Picture for which sentence P -> S 
true or false.
Two directions of move­
ment, two instructions: 
a ttend subject/object 
of action
Same, but o ther instruc­
tions: a ttend car/truck
P - * S
RT (Act) <  RT (Pass) 
Instruction x A/P inter­
action
RT (Act) <  RT (Pass) 
RT (True) <  RT (False) 
Instruction x position 
(car/truck) interaction
Table 1.2 (continued)
Authors Linguistic variables
3 Same
Roncato and Sonino (1976)
Wannemacher (1974)
Wannemacher
(1974)
I inside 
 ^outside B’, where
A, B are different figure 
names. Visual presenta­
tion
1 Active/Passive (A/P) 
Reversible/Irreversible
(R/I)
2 Same
1 As in Wannemacher
(1974)
2 Same
Pictoral variables Order Main results
Presentation of one 
vehicle, followed by pre­
sentation of the o ther 
higher or lower on the 
slope (focus)
Embedded or juxtaposed 
figures (circles, squares, 
triangles), which corres­
ponded or did not corres­
pond to figure names in 
sentence
P-> S
S-> P
P-* s
RT (Act) <  RT (Pass) 
RT (True) <  RT (False) 
Focus x Act/Pass inter­
action
S P faster than P S 
Faster RT if smallest 
object is mentioned first. 
Faster RT if figure does 
not correspond to name. 
True faster than  false
Pictures such that they 
create mismatch for 
subject, verb, or object 
of sentence or combina 
tions thereof 
( ‘t rea tm en ts ’)
P -> S
Same
As in Wannemacher
(1974)
Different RTs for ‘trea t­
m ents’ (object mismatch 
slowest). A/P-effect, 
R/I-effect Interactions: 
A/P x R/I 
A/P x treatm ent 
A/P x R/I x treatm ent
Simulta- Same
neous
S ^ P
Same, but only the three S P 
one-com ponent mismatch 
types
Interaction R/I x treat­
ments
Same
i.e. serial self-terminating 
comparison: logical sub­
ject -► verb logical 
object
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respect to the representation of sentence and of picture, different authors give 
different solutions. These are partly notational variants, but for another part 
important empirical issues are involved. The question is whether the same 
sentence (resp. picture) can be represented in different formats, dependent on 
task and practice, and on the prior presentation of the picture (resp. sentence). It 
is indeed the case that these factors can affect the way in which the subject codes 
the information. Examples of task and practice effects have already been 
mentioned in section 3.2.2, especially Trabasso et al.'s (248) finding that subjects 
apparently represent the sentence T h e  ball is not red’ by ‘GREEN (BALL)’. But 
this occurs only if there is no more than one (colour) alternative, and after the 
subject has had some practice. This is called the recoding strategy (45, see also 
150); it is assumed to have taken place if the true negative (TN) is judged faster 
than the false negative (FN). One wonders whether recoding is not a mere 
laboratory artifact. Interdependence between sentence and picture represen­
tations has been shown to exist by Clark, Carpenter, and Just (56); it has 
especially been demonstrated that the representation of the picture can be 
affected by prior presentation of the sentence.
Recoding and interdependence give the theorist quite a lot of leeway in 
modelling his data. One would like to have independent evidence that a partic­
ular situation leads the subject to recode (i.e. independent of the finding that 
TN <  FN); and similarly for interdependence. But otherwise, there is nothing 
against invoking such principles. Tanenhaus et al. (244) in a sharp critique of 
Carpenter and Just’s (45) paper, to which we will return shortly, criticize the 
arbitrariness in the use of a once-chosen format of representation. They refer 
especially to inconsistencies in the use of an affirmative embedding predicate 
(AFF) in the internal representations, inconsistencies which do indeed affect 
predicted reaction times. More agreement, however, seems to exist with respect 
to the order of comparison one must assume. The principle seems to be ‘inside 
out’: the embedded propositions are verified before the embedding 
propositions.
Let us, finally, return to the Tanenhaus et al.'s (244) critique of verification 
studies, which was mostly addressed to Carpenter and Just (who reacted to it in 
46). Apart from technicalities relating to the question of whether the choice of 
internal representations is ad hoc, the exchange of views is primarily 
demonstrative of a clash in aims. The Tanenhaus et al. paper demonstrates what 
we have called the linguistic aim in section 1 : to explain how the hearer uses his 
knowledge of the language to encode sentences in terms of linguistic structural 
descriptions. It is argued that the verification approach does not tell us how the 
verification representations are derived but only how the comparison is done. 
The latter is said to be of marginal interest for a theory of sentence under­
standing. Carpenter and Just, on the other hand, place themselves much more in 
the communicative framework: how does the listener use linguistic and non- 
linguistic information in order to answer questions? For this, it is highly
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important for the listener to find out the referents of what is said, and this 
process is studied in the verification literature. So far, the discussion has little 
theoretical import: if one is mainly interested in studying the derivation of 
internal representations, one should not join the verification club. If, however, 
one’s aim is to find out how linguistic information is used vis-à-vis perceptual or 
encyclopaedic knowledge, then verification studies can be quite useful. An 
important theoretical issue does arise, however, if one wants to realize both aims 
at the same time. Tanenhaus et al. assume that the verification representation 
which is used in the verification process, and which is task-dependent, is in its 
turn derived from a prior, and much more general-purpose representation. This 
is, of course, the structural description mentioned earlier. Here is an interesting 
empirical assumption: deriving a structural description is a first step in deriving 
anything else (a conceptual structure, a verification representation). This issue 
will be taken up again in section 4.1.1.
3.6. Non-pictoral context: Given and new information
In section 2.2.5 various studies were listed in which a sentence had to be 
understood (verified), given another sentence or certain encyclopaedic 
knowledge. In most respects these studies were concerned with the same 
theoretical issues as the sentence/picture verification studies (i.e. congruence, 
markedness, etc.) Here we will limit ourselves to mentioning some studies of a 
different theoretical flavour, namely those deriving from Clark’s notion of the 
given/new contract. Clark and Haviland (59) starting from Grice’s ( 114) notion 
of a ‘cooperative principle’ in conversation, propose the existence of 
‘cooperative1 information-exchanging strategies used by speaker and listener. 
At any moment the speaker presupposes certain items of information to be 
available to the hearer. These are the ‘givens’ to which the speaker can then add 
new information. The speaker will use special linguistic devices to express what 
he supposes to be given, and what he intends to be new. The listener, in his turn, 
will match this strategy by using what is linguistically marked as ‘given’ in order 
to locate the appropriate information in memory. He can then proceed to add 
the information linguistically marked as ‘new’ to the existing data structure. 
Clark and coworkers did various studies to show that violations of this 
given/new contract lead to complications in the comprehension process (59,
126, 236). A typical paradigm is to switch the linguistic marking of given and 
new, as in the following examples:
Context: Michelle ignored Sam, who was waiting at the bar. Turning her back, 
she began talking to a group of strangers. Sam was wild with jealousy.’ 
Sentence (a): ‘The dancer who disregarded Sam , motioned to Jack .’
Sentence (b): ‘The dancer who motioned to Jack, disregarded Sam .’ If the 
context is followed by sentence (a), everything is according to the contract. The 
relative clause expresses (as it should) information already given in the context.
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In (b), however, the relative clause (linguistically marking information as given) 
in fact expresses new information. Clark found longer reading and compre­
hension times required for (b) than for (a). In (b) the listener is forced to switch 
the roles of given and new in order to integrate the sentence with the earlier 
context.
Though the given/new notion has a long tradition in linguistics, these are the 
first studies where its role in sentence processing is studied. It appears from two 
other studies (Hornby, 137; Just and Clark, 151) that given (presupposed) 
information is harder to verify than new; this is in accord with the general 
theory. (See especially Clark’s contribution to this volume.)
3.7. Some conclusions
In the preceding review of linguistic and other independent variables used in 
sentence-comprehension studies, some of the major observations were:
(i) There is a gradual shift from considering prosody as a nuisance variable to 
a genuine interest in the comprehension of spoken (as opposed to written) 
language.
(ii) The effects of linguistic complexity on processing are not uniform. Not 
only are some complexity variables, such as verb structure, only marginally 
effective, but in many cases (voice, negation) the effect depends on the communi­
cative setting in which the sentence is used.
(iii) Lexical ambiguity almost always increases the processing load of a 
sentence. However, in all but garden-path and similar cases, working memory 
seems not to be involved in this.
(iv) It is still undetermined which perceptual mechanisms cause clause-like 
entities to function as processing units.
(v) The controversy about the usefulness of verification studies for a theory of 
sentence understanding signals a clash of aims in the psycholinguistic literature.
4. T H E O R E T IC A L  C O N SID ER A TIO N S
In section 1 it was pointed out that there is little disagreement about the central 
importance of a theory of sentence understanding. There is also little 
controversy about the general aim of a theory of sentence comprehension, which 
should be able to explain the processes involved in understanding sentences used 
in ordinary contexts. But from this point on every single step is controversial. 
There is a double tension to be noted in the literature. Firstly, there is a disagree­
ment concerning the definition of understanding. Fodor et al. (80), Tanenhaus 
et al. (244), and others reserve the term for what I will call immediate linguistic 
awareness (ILA): the almost instantaneous awareness of the underlying proposi- 
tional structure of the sentence. Others (Schank, 226, Bransford, 30, 34) use the
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term to denote the process mediating between syntactic input and the 
completion of a linguistic or non-linguistic task (memory task, paraphrase task, 
verification task, etc.). This difference is not a matter of the mere restriction of 
empirical domain. That would be the case if the latter type of processes would 
necessarily contain the former type as proper subpart. This is, rather, an 
empirical issue. The question is whether in all sentence comprehension there is 
an initial stage during which the underlying linguistic structure of the sentence is 
derived. We will call this the immediate linguistic awareness (ILA) hypothesis. 
Closely connected to this issue is the question of whether this initial stage, if 
appearing at all, corresponds to the existence of a separate memory mechanism, 
a short-term store, or whether one has to assume a continuum of depth of 
processing. This is the subject of section 4.1.
The second tension concerns the measure in which the theory should be 
formalized and the type of formalization to be chosen. There is the full range, 
from completely unformalized theories such as the one proposed by Bransford 
and his associates (e.g. 31, 34) to completely formalized ones such as Wanner’s 
ATN models (259, 260, 261). Usually the formalized theories either concern a 
very limited aspect of comprehension or, if more generally applicable, are still 
very limited in the range of phenomena for which they have been worked out 
and empirically tested. They are discussed in section 4.3. That section is 
preceded by some remarks on the role of context in comprehension (section 4.2).
4.1. Immediate understanding and depth of  processing
4.1.1 Immediate awareness and task dependency
All experimental studies on sentence perception involve some explicitly stated 
or implicit task for the subject. This is not entirely artificial: in ordinary 
language perception also the hearer listens for something. Dependent on the 
situation, this can be almost anything: whether the voice is male or female, 
whether there is an implicit request, whether the sentence answers an earlier 
question, etc. If there is any truth to the claim that laboratory studies of sentence 
perception are ipso facto  unnatural and thus meaningless, it cannot be 
ascertained simply because of the fact that specific tasks are set in the 
laboratory. Subjects participating in laboratory experiments never tell us that 
this is not the real world. The only argument for the claim could be that the task 
dependency of linguistic processing is not sufficiently studied in itself and that 
too general conclusions are drawn from too limited task environments. Various 
studies have show that sentence processing is critically dependent on the task 
requirements (4, 41, 95, 96, 110, 197, 199, 252), and one could conjecture that 
sentence understanding is idiosyncratic to the task and that generalizations from 
laboratory studies are not allowed. Although some authors come close to this 
position, there is a very general tendency in the literature to gravitate towards 
another solution. We called this the ‘immediate liguistic awareness (ILA)
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hypothesis’, and a general formulation of it could be as follows: The initial part 
of any sentence comprehension consists o f  deriving a complete underlying 
representation o f  the sentence. The I LA hypothesis involves two strong 
empirical claims. First, the initial stage is identical for any comprehension task, 
and thus task-independent. Second, the output of the initial stage is a complete 
underlying representation. Since the derived representation should be general 
purpose (i.e. suitable for any task), it should be an almost complete linguistic 
analysis of the sentence, containing all semantically relevant information. 
Authors who adhere to the ILA hypothesis differ substantially in the charac­
terization of this initial internal representation, as will appear from the 
following enumeration:
The immediate perception hypothesis has its roots in what in the 1960s was 
called the coding hypothesis: a sentence was supposed to be coded in memory in 
the form of its deep structure (see Johnson-Laird, 143; Levelt, 168; and Fodore/  
al., 80 for detailed statements and analyses of the coding hypothesis). The 
hypothesis was proved to be false (see especially Bransford et al., 30, and Fodor 
et al., 80), but the idea that the underlying structure of the sentence becomes 
available at some time during sentence processing is still rather generally 
endorsed. Clark (51) stresses the importance o f ‘the base strings’: ‘they constitute 
the essential part of the interpretation of the sentence and should therefore play 
an important part whenever the interpretation is needed at a later time’. Clark 
(54) proposes a ‘deep-structure hypothesis’ to characterize the internal represen­
tation of the sentence. Even if the subject’s task is such that he should ignore the 
literal interpretation of the sentence—as is the case in coping with conveyed 
requests—Clark and Lucy (60) have shown that this literal interpretation is 
nevertheless derived first, thus testifying to the empirical validity of the task- 
independency of the immediate linguistic awareness. A similar claim is made by 
Cutler (68).
Garrod and Trabasso (105) also express the deep-structure hypothesis: ‘the 
prior sentence is held long enough for a deep-structure representation to be 
derived and stored in long-term memory’. They add the claim that surface 
information may be stored in LTM as well, which is further supported by a study 
by Anderson (5). Fodor et al. (80) argue extensively that the internal represen­
tation of a perceived sentence coincides with the linguistic structural descrip­
tion. If empirical data show that the structural description proposed by transfor­
mational theory is not available to the subject, Fodor et al. (81) would prefer 
that the linguists change their theory rather than have the psychologists forfeit 
this principle of identifying internal representation and linguistic description. It 
should be noted, however, that Fodor (78) argues for a much shallower 
immediate processing: ‘The representation of a sentence that must be recovered 
in understanding it is relatively ¿/^abstractly related to the surface form of the 
sentence’ (p. 154). Another example of the ILA hypothesis can be found in 
Tanenhaus et al. (244). As discussed in section 3.5, these authors severely 
criticized Carpenter and Jus t’s (45) processing models derived from
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sentence/picture verification studies mainly because the sentence encodings (i.e. 
internal representations) which are proposed are different for every study, 
rather arbitrary in nature, and extremely task-dependent. In section 3.5 we 
mentioned that the theoretically important part of the criticism is that a model 
of sentence understanding should adhere to the ILA-hypothesis. The authors 
propose a two-stage model: ‘First, they (the subjects) understand the sentence, 
developing a representation for it. Then they extract a verification represen­
tation from the comprehension representation. The form of the verification 
representation depends on the particular verification task’. The first stage is 
what we called ‘immediate linguistic awareness’, and it is task-independent. The 
exact nature of the comprehension representation, however, remains 
unspecified in this paper; it is even left open whether it can be linguistically 
defined. Forster and Olbrei (85) take the risk of making themselves extremely 
vulnerable at this point: ‘when syntactic analysis is required by the task 
conditions, it is executed without regard for the meaning of the sentence. This 
conclusion tends to suggest that there must be a psychologically real level of 
description which is purely syntactic, and quite independent of the semantic 
representation’. The statement does not imply the two-stage model, but Forster 
and Olbrei’s experiments (see also Gamlin, 99) would make a strong case for
Tanenhaus et al.'s comprehension representation to be syntactic. Miller
(193), inspired by the work of Davies and Isard (70), proposes a stage of
immediate awareness, by disconnecting ‘the understanding of a sentence from 
any actions it might entail’. One can refuse to obey  a command, but not to 
understand  a command. In computer terms the first stage (‘understanding’) 
consists of compiling the program, with natural language functioning as a 
higher-level programming language. The output, then, is a set of lower-level 
sub-routines which may or may not be executed, dependent on the task- 
environment. If this output is linquistically characterized by means of 
grammatical rules, then these rules are abstractions from the computer (resp. 
language understander); they are not components of it.
Thus, although all these authors assume the existence of a task-independent
initial phase, the character of the initial internal representation differs widely: a 
syntactic deep structure (semantically uninterpreted), a propositional hierarchy, 
a much shallower surface-related representation, and a set of (semantic, 
conceptual?) subroutines have all been used as representations.
The different variants of the ILA hypothesis are empirically interesting only if 
they are explicit about the structure of this internal representation. The 
existence of a task-independent representation can only be demonstrated if one 
is fairly precise about the nature of that representation. I am not familiar with 
any empirical evidence (either in favour or against) which is of this strong 
nature. The advantage of these theories is, however, that they are stronger than 
alternative theories in which understanding is completely task-dependent. 
Stronger theories are more stimulating, even if they are quite probably false.
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Another major obligation of these theories is to describe the processes by 
which this initial internal representation is derived. In this respect the situation is 
plainly poor. Clark (54) does not propose a parser for this deep-structure 
hypothesis; he is clearly more interested in later task-dependent aspects of 
comprehension. Fodor et al. (80) propose and empirically test some so-called 
strategies. One of them is the canonical sentoid strategy, whenever the hearer 
encounters the surface sequence NP-V(-NP), he or she assumes that these items 
are, respectively, subject, verb and object of a deep sentoid. Although there is 
empirical evidence for the correctness of some of these strategies, or parsing 
principles (see also Kimball, 156), there is a major lack of clarity about how these 
strategies interconnect, whether they are hierarchically organized, what 
happens if two strategies lead to opposite results, at which point in the sentence a 
strategy is called for— in short what sort of control structure is involved in 
sentence perception.
One way to explore these questions more systematically is to cast strategies in 
the form of augmented transition-network (ATN) models; we will return to this 
in section 4.3.2.
As far as derivational processes have been proposed, one is left with the 
impression that the hearer accumulates surface information during presentation 
of the clause, and that by the very end of the clause there is a flurry of internal 
processing, leading more or less immediately to determination of the underlying 
structure. As we have seen in section 2, such theories are mostly based on 
successive measurement, which supplies little information about the precise 
structure of the knowledge which is accumulated during the input of the 
sentence.
There are, moreover, theoretical and empirical arguments against this view of 
processing. If one looks into Riesbeck’s (212) parser, which is intended to be 
psychologically realistic, it is clear that processing at all levels (phonological, 
syntactic, semantic, conceptual) takes place right from the beginning. Parsing is 
not hierarchical in the sense that syntactic operations precede semantic and 
conceptual operations; it is heterarchical: a process at one level is able to call a 
process at any other level without a hierarchical transfer of control (see 
Haggard, 116; Winograd, 268).
One of the most challenging of empirical issues is to demonstrate the 
psychological reality of such distributed control. Apart from the ATN-work (see 
section 4.2), the shadowing experiments by Marslen-Wilson (184, 185, 186, 187) 
should be mentioned here. Phonological, syntactic and semantic effects on 
shadowing performance could be demonstrated to be taking place already at the 
very beginning of the sentence, even if shadowing delay were not more than one 
syllable. A similar simultaneous availability of phonological and semantic 
information could be shown by measuring monitoring latencies: reaction times 
for rhyme-monitoring were the same as RTs for (semantic) category- 
monitoring. Also, Mistler-Lachman’s experimental results (see section 4.1.2)
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suggest that a full syntactic analysis, if performed at all, may follow semantic 
analysis. If sentence processing is of this heterarchical nature, there is reason to 
doubt an immediate derivation of deep structure (as in Clark, 54; Garrod and 
Trabasso, 105; Fodor et al. 80, Tanenhaus et al., 244). If conceptual parsing is 
taking place from the first word on, it seems to be rather awkward, as Marslen- 
Wilson (186) remarks, ‘that the initial target of the processing system is a deep- 
structure representation of the input1. This doubt is also expressed by Bransford 
and McCarrell (34): ‘It seems reasonable to assume that the surface structurally 
similar sentences The house squeaked  and The window squeaked  are 
understood differently not because one first discovers a deep structure and then 
interprets the meaning of the lexical items, but because one’s knowledge of the 
entities and events in the sentence forces different semantic interpretations to be 
made’. Other statements of this so-called constructive view of sentence 
comprehension can be found in 14, 30, 94, and 136. However, there is certainly 
not enough empirical evidence now to reject all versions of the ILA hypothesis, 
especially those which are more semantic in nature. Much more precise experi­
mentation is necessary to refute the existence of a task-independent first 
processing stage and of a general-purpose internal representation.
4.1.2 Stores versus levels o f  processing
#
An attractive though not essential processing model for variants of the ILA 
hypothesis is a multi-store model, consisting of at least a short-term and a long­
term store (STS, LTS). The STS would contain a verbatim representation of the 
sentence or clause, which is maintained until the parsing operations involved in 
deriving a deep structure have taken place. The resulting deep representation is 
put into LTS, to be available for further processing. This is essentially the model 
proposed by Jarvella (141) and Fodor et al. (80). Garrod and Trabasso (105) 
andAnderson (5) have argued that surface information may as well be sent to 
LTS; they maintain, however, that STS will not contain deep information. Since 
decay of the memory trace is quicker in STS than in LTS, variants of this 
successive-stores model can explain the longer persistence of propositional over 
verbatim information.
An alternative view has been expressed by Craik and Lockhart (66). These 
authors reject the multi-store model but try to explain the longer persistence of 
semantic information from the deeper level of processing necessary for deriving 
this information. The store model is initially replaced by a stagemodel. If 
extracting meaning presupposes the recognition of words, an early stage of 
processing would involve word recognition, whereas meaning extraction would 
take place at a later stage. These stages cannot be identified by pointing to 
successive stores with their own preferred internal code and their own decay 
time. The character of these stages is only stimulus- and task-dependent. Later 
in the same paper the authors qualify the stage terminology; they do not mean
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that logically prior analyses necessarily take place at earlier stages, and they 
refer to Savin and Bever (222) who showed that the syllable is usually more 
quickly recognized than is its initial phoneme. ‘Spread’ of encoding would be a 
better term than ‘depth’ of encoding, and the stages in fact form a continuum of 
increasing spread. This notion of spread of encoding agrees with the earlier 
mentioned idea of heterarchy: there is no hierarchical ordering of processing, 
neither in terms of stores, nor in terms of logical order.
Experimentally, depth of processing has been manipulated in two ways: by 
task and by stimulus. Most studies manipulate by task. The best examples are 
found in the studies by Mistler-Lachman (197, 198, 199). In 197 she presented 
sentences to subjects with or without ambiguity. Two of her tasks were: 
judgment of meaningfulness and constructing a good continuation of the 
sentence. She measured reaction times in the two situations. Presumably 
judgment of meaningfulness does not require ambiguity resolution: processing 
can be relatively shallow. Deeper processing is required for the other task, and 
presumably ambiguity should be resolved. RTs on sentence continuation indeed 
turned out to be longer for ambiguous sentences, whereas ambiguity did not 
affect the time required for making a meaningfulness judgment. In 198 Mistler- 
Lachman showed that the thus demonstrated shallower processing in meaning­
fulness judgments leads to a quicker decay of the memory trace, as predicted by 
Craik and Lockhart. Gamlin (99) also used tasks as a variable: question- 
answering probe latency with similar results.
One can also affect the level of processing by manipulation of the stimulus 
material. Marslen-Wilson and Tyler (188) repeated Jarvella’s experiments (see 
section 2 .2 .2 ) but varied the quality of the text: it could either be normal text, so- 
called ‘syntactic prose’, text which is semantically uninterpretable but syntactic­
ally correct, and random word-order text. The Jarvella-effect, i.e. less accurate 
recall of the penultimate clause, was substantially more marked for syntactic 
prose than for normal prose. Syntactic prose prevents deep (semantic) pro­
cessing, and since recall is a function of depth (Craik and Lockhart), the 
theory correctly predicts this substantial forgetting of syntactic prose. It is not 
obvious how a two-store model would make the same prediction. Although task- 
dependency is naturally handled in the depth of processing model, the 
existence of an initial task-independent phase in sentence comprehension is not 
contradictory to this view: the dependability of multi-store models remains an 
empirical issue. For  a critical discussion of the sort of information that might 
discriminate between single-and multi-store models, see Wickelgren (264).
4.2. Comprehension in context
Language understanding is largely a matter of finding out the speaker’s 
intentions. This review was originally to have included a section on the various 
means and processes by which the listener can determine intentions on the basis
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of literal meaning of what is said plus the context in which it is said. I would have 
discussed empirical work on given and new information, conversational 
postulates, anaphoric and definite reference, and major attention would have 
given to the work of Clark and coworkers. In view of Clark’s own very full 
treatment of these issues in this book, my own review would be superfluous; it is 
therefore omitted. It is only for referential completeness that the bibliography 
contains numbers 14, 28, 31, 32, 33, 59, 60, 73, 94, 126, 135, 137, and 151, which 
are relevant to the issues under concern.
4.3. Formal theories o f  sentence understanding
4.3.1 Transformational models
Transformational models of sentence perception emerged during the sixties as a 
psychological answer to the newly developed transformational linguistics. 
Extensive reviews of these models and their empirical tenability can be found in 
the literature; the reader is especially referred to Levelt (170), and to Fodor et al. 
(80). Both reviews show that initially transformational grammar was adopted as 
an isomorphistic model; this isomorphism had two related but separable 
characteristics: the first is the derivational theory o f  complexity  (DTC), the 
second is the so-called coding hypothesis. DTC means that the processing of a 
sentence simulates the transformational derivation of the sentence on a micro­
scale: each rule in the grammar has a one-to-one relationship with a particular 
psychological operation. This can still be done in very different ways, such as 
inversing transformations (Petrick, 208) or analysis-by-synthesis (Halle and 
Stevens 122).
If rule-for-rule isomorphism exists, one would also expect input-output 
isomorphism, i.e. at some early stage in comprehension the hearer is supposed to 
have available a surface-structure-like representation of the sentence, whereas 
after applying the transformation-related rules, this has been replaced by a deep- 
structure-like representation. This latter view is called the coding hypothesis (for 
different senses of the coding hypothesis, see Levelt, 170). Of course the latter 
can be valid, without DTC being valid, and that is the position taken by Fodor et 
al. (80). Carroll and Bever (47) put it this way: ‘(1) There is a variety of evidence 
for the psychological reality of linguistically defined surface and deep-structure 
representations of sentences. (2 ) There is no consistent evidence for the 
perceptual reality of transformations as perceptual processes’. This conclusion 
is not drawn in Levelt’s (170) review, where both DTC and deep-structure 
output theories are characterized as empirically untenable. The point is sharply 
made by Wanner (258) in his review of the Fodor  et al. book: ‘Why should we 
believe that deep-structure phrase markers are determined during compre­
hension, when the characteristics of deep structure are partially selected just in 
order to simplify the operation of the transformational rules, which themselves
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lack psychological reality? So far as I can see, there is no compelling reason to 
adhere to such a belief. One can search in vain through the deep-structure 
experiments which FBG review without finding any which test the psychological 
reality of the transformationally motivated aspect of deep structure.’
Miller and Johnson-Laird (194) make a similar point by stating that ‘Fodor, 
Bever, and Garrett assume, however, that the decoding processes compute the 
same structural description that a grammar does (p. 369), as if parsing were an 
end in itself, rather than an abstraction from (or trace of) the computations 
required to translate a sentence into an executable routine’. We will return to 
this point at the end of the next section.
4.3.2 Perceptual strategies and Augmented Transition Networks
Given the theoretical framework of Fodor et a i ,  the important psychological 
problem is to define and test psychological operations which can derive 
underlying structures from surface forms. These operations need not be linguis­
tically justifiable (see 20), and they are not necessarily foolproof. One example is 
the canonical sentoid strategy, mentioned above in section 4.4.1. There is no 
doubt that this approach has partly freed psycholinguists from their linguistic 
captivity: one could resume the search for interesting perceptual operating 
principles without being hampered by existing linguistic rule systems. This 
openness has led to a variety of highly interesting empirical observations, for
which the reader is referred to the Fodor et al. book.
At the same time, however, this approach has created a theoretical vacuum. 
As already noted in section 4.1.1 ,the control structure of the strategies approach 
remains unspecified; there is no theoretical basis for distinguishing possible 
from impossible strategies or for limiting the number of strategies to an 
‘optimal’, or canonical set. This vacuum is not easily filled so long as the aim of 
parsing is defined in deep-structural terms: formal objects which have no 
relevance for understanding will have to be created by the parsing process, 
whereas linguistic constraints are ignored in defining the perceptual operations. 
Augmented Transition Networks (ATNs) may provide the formal means of 
leaving the vicious circle. Some important arguments are:
(i) Transformational grammars can always be translated in the ATN- 
formalism, since ATNs have Turing machine power. By doing so, properties of 
TG-generated structures which are only there for the sake of TG-formalism  can 
disappear in an ATN representation. There is no further need to generate them 
by the parsing process.
(ii) The ATN is a linguistic theory; but as I have written elsewhere (170), ‘It is 
no longer the psychological theory which is adapted to the grammar, but rather 
the grammar which is written for the representation of psychological processing 
operations. If such a network at the same time provides all input sentences with
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their correct grammatical parsing, this new isomorphism is of a more acceptable 
kind than the naive isomorphism discussed (above)’. Therefore, the ATN does 
behave properly according to linguistic constraints.
(iii) The output of an ATN need not be a deep structure (even stripped from 
its incidental formal characteristics). Underlying grammatical relations will be 
operative at various stages of the parsing process, without necessarily being 
represented in the end-product of the parsing process.
(iv) ATN networks allow for semantic and pragmatic conditions on transi­
tions and for building operations which create semantic and pragmatic output 
(see especially Miller and Johnson-Laird, 194).
Though syntactic and non-syntactic aspects of ATNs are clearly separable, 
ATNs give a natural means for expressing distributed syntactic—semantic 
control. Specific operating characteristics of ATNs which make them especially 
‘human’ (such as left-to-right processing) have been enumerated by Wanner and 
Maratsos (260).
Rather then enumerate these advantages, we shall present an example of an 
ATN network, taken from Wanner et al. (259), and designed as a demonstration 
example.
In the ATN of Figure 1.1 circles denote states, and arrows transitions. The 
initial state is S() (S for ‘sentence’) and the upper network is the sentence network. 
A set of conditions and a set of actions is assigned to each transition. Conditions 
are given over the arrows in Figure 1.1, actions are listed separately. If the ATN 
is in a given state, a transition from there to a next state can be made if the parti­
cular condition is fulfilled. For instance, the transition from S0 to S, requires 
that an NP has been detected (i.e. one has to ‘seek’ an NP in order to make a 
transition). To go from S, to S2 requires the input of an item (word) of category 
V, i.e. a verb, and so on. In the case of SEEK conditions, control has to be shifted 
to the appropriate network. In order to satisfy the SEEK NP condition from S0 
to S ,, the state S0 is pushed down and control shifts to the NP network, specifi­
cally to N P0. If this network is successfully passed, i.e. reaches the NP4-end state, 
control is popped to S0 and the transition to S, can be made. An ATN may 
consist of several networks, between which control can shift back and forth. If 
there is more than one possible transition from a given state, as in NP,, it is 
customary to arrange them clockwise in such a way that the first arc after 12 is 
tried first, and so forth. The final state is reached when (a) the ATN is in the end 
state of the sentence network, and (b) there are no states left in the push-down 
store.
Actions can be of several kinds. If one wants to use an ATN as a syntactic 
parser which gives phrase structures as output, actions have to assign category 
symbols (such as NP) a n d /o r  grammatical functions (such as subject), and to 
assemble types of structures. In other words, a phrase (e.g. an NP), when built
and categorized, is stored in a functional register (a subject-register, an object-
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noun phrase network:
Arc Action
1 ASSIGN SUBJECT to current phrase
2 ASSIGN ACTION to  current word
3 ASSIGN OBJECT to current phrase
4 ASSEMBLE CLAUSE
SEND current clause
5 ASSIGN DET to current word
6 ASSIGN MOD to  current word
7 ASSIGN HEAD to current word
8 ASSEMBLE NOUN PHRASE
SEND current phrase
9 HOLD
10 CHECK HOLD
ASSIGN MOD to  current clause
11 ASSEMBLE NOUN PHRASE
SEND current phrase
12 (no action)
F ig u re  1.1. A s im p le  A T N  g r a m m a r  fo r  sen ten ces  w i th  re la t ive  c lauses  
( f r o m  W a n n e r ,  K a p la n ,  a n d  S h in e r )
register, etc.). But actions can equally well be of certain semantic types. Miller 
and Johnson-Laird (194) call such actions executions. These may be very task- 
specific activities which the listener chooses to perform. One example is that at a 
certain transition the referent of the particular word or phrase, specified in the 
condition, is looked up in long-term memory. (Such examples are not given in 
Figure 1.1.)
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Wanner et al. (259) demonstrate the working of the example ATN by parsing
the sentence ‘The old man that the boy loved caught the fish’. Roughly, the
parsing proceeds as follows. From S0, control shifts to N P 0 in order to find an
NP. ‘The old man’ leads via transitions 5, 6, and 7 to state N P 2-end. In order to
make transition 9, one needs a relative pronoun, which is in fact present (‘that').
The action taken here is important. The categorized information (i.e. DET,
MOD, HEAD; see actions 5, 6, 7) are put in a special register, the so-called
HOLD register; that is, no grammatical function (subject, object) is assigned.
This is postponed to a later stage. There is a good reason for doing this, since the 
grammatical function of the first NP in a relative-clause sentence depends on
later information. In order to make the last transition within the NP network, 
control has to be transferred to the sentence network (i.e. at the moment S() and 
N P 3 are on the push-down store). For the first transition control has to go again 
to the NP network, which parses ‘the boy’ as an NP. From S,, the verb ‘loved’ 
leads to S2, after which the NP network takes over again. Since transition 5 
cannot be made, transition 12 can be made by retrieving the information from 
the HOLD register (The d e t  oldMoD man h e a d  )• Transition 11 leads to assem­
bling this as an N P ;  and at popping back to S2, this NP is assigned to OBJECT- 
function. In this way, the ATN takes care that ‘the old man’ becomes the object of 
Moved’. The further steps are obvious: After assembling the relative clause (4), 
control returns to S0, transition 1 can be made, and the verb ‘caught’, followed 
by the NP ‘the fish’, leads to S3-end, plus an empty push-down store.
Returning now to the ATN-literature, it should be remarked that the notion 
stems from Thorne et a l 's (245) parsing system for English, and was further 
developed by Bobrow and Fraser (29) and Woods (270). It found its first psycho­
logical application in Kaplan (152), who showed how some of Bever’s 
‘perceptual strategies’ could be cast in the ATN formalism. Further psycho­
logical applications were made by Kaplan (153), Stevens and Rumelhart (239) 
on a reading task, by Wanner et al. on relative clause comprehension (259, 260), 
and by Wanner and Shiner on structural ambiguities (262). Wanner and 
Maratsos (260) give evidence for the memory-loading effect of using the HOLD 
register (see above). The elegant theoretical analysis deserves further empirical 
verification by means of acoustical simultaneous measurement techniques.
But the theoretical concepts also need further psychological interpretation. It 
is normal for an ATN to have various stores and registers: a push-down store for 
keeping track of control shifts, registers for assigning functions to built subtrees, 
and a H O LD  register for keeping uninterpreted structures. How do these stores 
relate to working memory, short- and long-term storage, levels of processing, 
and similar concepts described in the memory literature? In this connection, 
Anderson’s (6) critique of the ATN approach should be especially mentioned. 
Anderson clearly recognizes the various attractions of ATNs but doubts 
whether they will ever become psychological models. Because of their Turing 
machine power, they have no intrinsic limitation. Human cognitive limitations, 
therefore, should be explicitly imposed on the models. The question is whether
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there are natural ways to do so, or whether one is forced into an arbitrary set of 
limiting assumptions. Anderson shows, for instance, that HOLD cannot be the 
only reason for the increased processing load of centre-embedded sentences. 
The recursive shifts of control (SEEK operations) should be a cause as well, but 
then right-branching structures should also be difficult, since they involve the 
same SEEK operations. Moreover, there is no natural limitation on the size of a 
network, nor therefore on the size of the structure to be assembled after reaching 
the end-state. Would a large assembled structure use up so much memory 
capacity that it would interfere with the assembling of further structures? In 
addition, ATNs are of little help for syntactically scrambled or incomplete 
sentences which may still be interpretable. And in actuality, human listeners 
often skilfully interpret such utterances. Clearly, therefore, ATNs cannot be the 
answer to all problems; and in fact Anderson replaces it by his so-called ACT 
model, which retains some of the ATNs advantages but is less powerful and 
claimed to be psychologically more realistic.
What is important is to recognize that we have a class of models here which is 
at the ‘right’ level of theorizing. They are more local and experimentally more 
testable than are AI-models of language understanding (see the following 
section), but at the same time they are more structured than mere lists of 
perceptual strategies.
If we now reconsider the TLA hypothesis’ (section 4.1.1), we see that ATN 
models may be able to give a refined version of it. Miller and Johnson-Laird
(194) use ATNs to ‘translate’ the sentence into routines, as in a compiler. These 
(semantic) routines may or may not be executed, depending on the task and the 
motivation of the hearer; but the compiling process itself is automatic, and in 
general outside voluntary control. ‘Immediate awareness’ here means 
compiling, it is not task-specific, and it is the first phase of understanding. 
However, it is the first phase only in a logical sense; this does not mean that one 
has to wait until the end of the clause or sentence in order to execute the routines. 
Routines appear at successive stages of the ATN parsing process, and execution 
can be done as soon as the routine appears. Thus, syntactic and interpretative 
activity may go on in parallel, in correspondence with Marslen-Wilson’s 
empirical findings (184, 186, 188), whereas at the same time a distinction is 
maintained between automatic-general and voluntary task-specific operations 
in language understanding.
One thing, however, is not taken care of so long as one maintains the logical 
priority of ‘translation’. There is some evidence that the results of executing 
routines can feed back to the translation process. Marslen-Wilson and Tyler’s 
(187) finding that word-, rhyme-, and category-monitoring are slower for 
syntactic (i.e. meaningless) prose than for normal prose points in this direction. 
From these and other results Marslen-Wilson concludes that syntactic and 
semantic analysis proceed in parallel and interactively. In order to describe such 
an inverse (top-down) flow of information more formally, one has to consider 
what is called goal-oriented parsing  in artificial intelligence.
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4.3.3 The artificial intelligence approach
Riesbeck and Schank’s contribution to the present volume contains a thorough 
statement of the principles and structure of goal-oriented, natural language 
parsing. This makes it somewhat superfluous to review these issues here. We will 
limit ourselves to a few general remarks. The parallel-interactive features of 
sentence comprehension are a natural consequence of AI-parsing principles, at 
least those of Schank (224, 225, 226) and Wilks (265): ‘The common linguistic 
model with a syntactic analysis phase followed by a semantic interpretation is a 
good example of what we are against. The modules in the understanding process 
affect each other in both directions’ (Riesbeck and Schank, this volume). If the 
ultimate goal of parsing is to extract meaning, i.e. to derive a conceptual 
representation, semantic considerations should have priority over syntactic 
ones. The latter become important if the interpretation is highly unexpected. ‘I 
think that syntax exists so that we can say improbable things’ (Garrett, 103). 
Parsing in these systems goes from left to right, without much backing up. It is 
essentially expectation-based, where expectation is due to knowledge of the 
world as well as to prior (con)text. It is encouraging that such systems can be 
built.
One should keep in mind, however, that even the most promising systems still 
have serious limitations. Like ATNs, they all have Turing machine power, and 
the question which has to be answered is what sort of restrictive principles have 
to be imposed in order to make these programs human-like. Also, in spite of 
their power, all present systems show time characteristics which make them 
unrealistically slow if their knowledge of the world, or data base, is expanded to 
a more realistic size. Efforts to partition the data base into ‘frames’ (195) or 
‘scripts’ (2) are very much in a beginning phase, whereas the whole notion is 
badly undefined. Levelt (171) discusses how existing systems are unable to 
account for language acquisition. Anderson (6) makes a similar point and 
enumerates several other weaknesses of computer language systems. Neverthe­
less, there can be no doubt that AI (and AI-related research) has become 
increasingly influential in the study of language understanding. Some major 
sources in this literature are by Winograd (268, 269), Anderson and Bower (7), 
Anderson (6), Norman and Rumelhart (203), Schank (226), and Miller and 
Johnson-Laird (194). The recent convergence of insights from AI and 
experimental psycholinguistics gives one the hope that essential AI principles 
(as opposed to accidental properties of parsing programs—and authors are 
often not very clear about this distinction) will lend themselves to empirical tests 
in the near future.
4.4. Conclusions
Section 1 cited three broad types of aim in the study of sentence perception: 
linguistic, conceptual, and communicative. During the first few years of the
reviewed period, the linguistic aim was the dominant one. Two causes may have 
contributed to this state of affairs. Firstly, there was still an echo sounding from 
the linguistic revolution of the nineteen-sixties. Secondly, the range of research 
methods developed during the nineteen-sixties belonged mostly to the class of 
successive measurement. These methods are particularly inapt for disproving 
the stage-like character of the models which had been developed within the 
linguistic framework. More specifically, it is hard to reject the notion that 
syntactic analysis of the clause precedes semantic analysis, that semantic 
analysis precedes the search for referents in long-term memory, and so on. 
Therefore, one could always maintain that in comprehending a sentence a 
listener first takes a general-purpose linguistic (and probably syntactic) step, 
and only then resorts to specific inferential activities which are tailored to the 
conceptual and communicative requirements of the particular task. This, 
moreover, would make the different types of aim compatible, and in fact 
complementary.
Two other causes, however, have badly undermined this picture during the 
second half of the reviewed period. Firstly, the development of simultaneous- 
measurement techniques has made it possible to demonstrate the highly inter­
active nature of sentence-understanding processes: semantic decisions which 
can take place quite early in the sentence can affect syntactic and phonetic 
decisions, and it is not quite clear any more what occurs prior to what. Secondly, 
developments in artificial intelligence and related fields became increasingly 
influential in psycholinguistic theory construction. Goal-oriented parsing is 
most effectively realized in a heterarchical system where control is distributed.
It would be wrong, however, to replace one pet theory by another. Not 
undermined, for instance, is the notion that syntax plays an important role in 
sentence understanding. It will take much and thorough experimentation to 
determine how syntactic operations interact with semantic and conceptual 
decisions as the listener infers the intentions of the speaker. This type of research
might profit from theories which are more local than full-size computer models 
of language understanding but more inclusive and more structured than a mere 
list of understanding strategies. Augmented transition networks form one 
example of such a level of theorizing, but other types of models should not be 
excluded.
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